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ABSTRACT 
 
Together with the enactment of a new legislature in the form of SPLUMA (16: 
2013), the change from a provincial based DFA Tribunal to a local based SPLUMA 
Tribunal raised many implications and issues for the local government sector. The 
objective of the research was to explore the implications of adopting a local 
government based tribunal. The purpose was mainly focused on the operations of a 
tribunal. A qualitative method was used in the research and it included analysing 
contents as well as conducting interviews. International case studies were used to 
analyse the findings. It was found that the CJMM will use its planning committee as 
a temporary tribunal. The implementation of the tribunal has uncovered capacity, 
resource and governance issues that exist within the CJMM. Therefore, the 
implication of adopting and implementing a tribunal for the CJMM include having to 
increase resources and capacity as well finding ways to maintain the transparency 
within the tribunal. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
1.1 Setting the Scene 
 
At the writing of this research, South Africa was awaiting implementation of the 
already-enacted Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (16: 2013), simply 
SPLUMA, a national planning tool entailed with municipalities in mind. Therefore, in 
the advent of intergovernmental relations; politics of autonomy and independency 
and; resource capacity, the changing face of municipal planning is challenged with 
issues that seek political clarity and re-institutionalization wherewith it operates. 
The government legislated/enacted this Act (16: 2013) as a nation-wide framework 
that it is to be orchestrated at local government due to the immediate impact and 
responsibilities that the municipalities carry. 
 
The South African local government has inherited multiple service delivery backlogs 
from the apartheid era and it is continually developing to reach mandates that will 
benefit the people. In this developmental mandate, the Act (16: 2013) has re-
introduced tribunals (Municipal Planning Tribunals), as the key board or institutional 
body to dispose of land development and development planning applications as 
they pertain to municipal planning. The South African context is of import here, in 
that the duality of urban and rural setting in South Africa is entangled with all forms 
of convolutions, politics and a plethora of old order planning laws that still apply to 
date. This entanglement proves to be a thorn in the face of (municipal) planning. 
1.1.1 Background 
 
Since 1994, South Africa has tried to change (planning) legislation. This is because 
up until 1995, the South African planning system was based on different laws 
applying in white and black areas with different authorities responsible for planning 
at different spheres of government. The system was influenced by land acts of 1913 
and 1936 (Native Trust and Land Act (18: 1936)); by the colonial heritage of four 
Provincial Ordinances (still largely in effect today); by legislation applying at 
‘independent homelands’ and ‘self-governing territories’ and; the Black 
Communities Development Act (4: 1984), which came later with the acceptance of 
African urbanisation new laws. In 1991, LEFTEA (Less Formal Township 
Establishment Act (113: 1991) was introduced and was applied nationally, due to a 
land reform process that acknowledged the need to fast-track land development. 
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The idea to fast-track development was taken into the National Housing Forum, still 
in the early 1990s, and developed further in the quest for a unitary legislation. This 
is because much of the abovementioned legislation still applied, therefore, work 
began on became the Development Facilitation Act (67: 1995), commonly known as 
the DFA. The DFA (67: 1995) was summoned to remedy gaps left by the historical 
planning system. It was there to ‘formulate extraordinary ways that can facilitate 
and speed up the implementation of development programmes and applications as 
they relate to land’ (preamble). It introduced planning principles and development 
objectives yet most significantly is the introduction and implementation of planning 
tribunals (Tribunals). 
 
The Tribunals were independent decision-making bodies, under the provincial level 
of government, which had extraordinary powers to cut through red tape and 
dispose of land development and town planning applications within the provincial 
borders. So the DFA (67: 1995) operated from 1995 until 2010 when the 
constitutional court decided that parts of it (chapters 5 and 6) were 
unconstitutional. These chapters authorised the very provincial development 
tribunals that were established in terms of the Act (67: 1995) to determine rezoning 
and township establishment (development planning) applications within a 
municipal area. However, according to the Constitution (1996), the determination 
of applications on rezoning and township establishment falls within ‘municipal 
planning’ functions whereby municipalities have exclusive authority. 
 
A certain Gauteng Development Tribunal (GDT) was sent to court because the City 
of Johannesburg (CoJ) attested that the Tribunal approved town planning 
applications within their area of jurisdiction and in doing so, it failed to consider CoJ’ 
development planning tools and had a lenient hand than its own stringent criteria 
(CCT 89/09, 2010). This, according to CoJ, undermined the City’s municipal planning 
instruments and allowed for ‘forum-shopping’, which the CoJ is against.  
 
On the SCA (Supreme Court of Appeal) decision, it was decided that ‘municipal 
planning’ encompasses the disposal of town planning applications, township 
establishment and land rezoning and that ‘planning’ refers to the regulation and 
control of land use (CCT 89/09, 2010). These were seen as functions reserved for 
exercise by the local government and not any other sphere of government. Thus, 
the powers conferred on development tribunals, when cross-referenced with the 
Constitution (1996), were also unconstitutional. 
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A reprieve was required to amend the DFA (67: 1995) findings or a new legislature 
enacted as replacement. And so, SPLUMA (16: 2013) was introduced. SPLUMA (16: 
2013) provides for a standard, efficient, effective and integrated planning regulatory 
framework for land use and land use management. It also establishes land use 
tribunals (Tribunal) and appeal tribunals (Appeal Tribunal) while establishing Land 
Use Regulators in all spheres throughout the entire country. The Department of 
Rural Development and Land Reform (2013) viewed the Act (16: 2013) as 
framework legislation because it cannot be utilised in solitary but can only be fully 
effective as a suite of laws per government sphere, inclusive and in cooperation 
with Provincial Planning Acts and municipal planning by laws. The main elements of 
the Act (16: 2013) were premised upon Spatial Development Frameworks (SDFs) (5 
years to implement); Tribunals and Appeal Tribunals; Land Use Schemes (to cover 
the whole municipal area) and; it also made provision for applications of national 
interest (have to be approved by municipality as first authority). 
1.2 The Research Problem 
 
However, the introduction of SPLUMA (16: 2013) raised certain questions. The main 
problem was the implementation of adopting the Municipal Planning Tribunal 
because of governance (accountability and public justice), autonomy and 
independence, power and interest issues as well as the politicisation of issues 
together with monitoring and evaluation. The first one was the issue of governance. 
The issue of governance rises because of the state of local government 
(metropolitan municipalities) in South Africa.  
 
According to the National Treasury Report (2013), a total of 5 metros, including the 
City of Johannesburg (CoJ), are in contradiction with section 56 of the Municipal 
Financial Management Act (56: 2003) and this has a great impact on the general 
governance and operation of the local government. While CoJ has improved its 
financial state from 2009, it has continued to pose risks that stretch far into its very 
MOEs (Municipal Owned Entities). The National Treasury reported service delivery, 
fiscal risks and political interventions as the main issues that make good governance 
an obstacle for many metropolitan municipalities and other local government 
institutions. On political intervention, the report states that top-heavy political 
officials give general advice on administrative issues thereby making the role of 
administrative officers difficult. Secondly, it was due to this political interference on 
daily governing matters of the metropolitan municipalities that administrative 
decision making was closely linked to voting communities, and acquainted political 
officials. 
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The lack of skills and management experience were seen as factors that threaten 
the financial strength, and thus governance, for many municipalities (Ratings Afrika 
Municipal Financial Stability Index, 2012). In direct relation to the issue of 
governance was power and interest, which raised the issue of clientelism. The issue 
of clientelism rises because tribunals are historically non-departmental bodies that 
are established to settle disputes, and the SPLUMA Tribunal is one such institution 
that is to settle and dispose of land development applications and disputes within 
the local sphere of government. As such, the 2010 court between the previous 
Gauteng Development Tribunal (GDT) and CoJ elaborated on the concerns that 
power-holding decision makers can raise. The court case revealed that the GDT, in 
approving some of the land development applications, allowed for ‘forum-
shopping’ (CCT 89/09, 2010), which is an injustice to those whom normal 
application criteria is applied to. Secondly, governance is a power tool and that 
enables those in power to place their interests forward before others. 
 
Chapter 6 Part B of SPLUMA (16: 2013) provides for requirement for the 
establishment of Municipal Planning Tribunals (Tribunal) and Appeal Tribunals. It 
was noted that such a tribunal is to comprise of current municipal officials and the 
appeal tribunal is to include the municipal manager. Political intervention in matters 
of the Tribunal would promote injustice to the general public (the communities, 
development consultants) and could potentially create a new wave of forum-
shopping and nepotism-led developments. 
 
At the heart of Institutional governance, power and interest was the next issue, the 
relationships between the Tribunal and the municipal council, and this is concerning 
matters of transparency as well as the politicisation of issues within local 
government. The same National Treasury report (2009; 2013) cited political 
interference as an issue and went on to say that the deterioration in the 
management of municipal finances was a result of correct procedures being 
undermined. The level of transparency, if there exists something of that sort, within 
most municipalities was linked to over spending on operation and thus increasing 
service delivery backlog and performance standards. If issues are politicised, there 
was a strong correlation between service delivery mandates and political agendas, 
as the two then intertwine. While the CoJ is one of the most resourceful 
municipalities, it also is one of the most watched upon local governments when it 
comes to governance, transparency and accountability to its citizens. 
 
 
 
5 
 
1.3 Research Question  
 
What are the implications of the SPLUMA’ Municipal Planning Tribunal’s decision-
making processes on development planning applications? 
1.3.1 Research Sub-Questions 
 
How will municipalities implement the adopting of the SPLUMA Tribunal? 
 
In what way will the locational factors (the geographical relationship 
between the municipality and the tribunal) affect or not affect the tribunal? 
 
In what way will the effect or possibility of clientelism in government and 
the tribunal be alleviated? 
 
There is a link between patrimonialism and clientelism, in what way will 
municipalities monitor and evaluate the Tribunal? 
 
In what way will the tribunal be guaranteed autonomy and independence 
from the municipal council or any other outside influence? 
 
In democratic society, all parties are involved in the decision-making. 
There are certain factions of the society that feel that the SPLUMA tribunal 
is exclusive to the political representatives. How will the issue of 
politicisation be dealt with? (Potential politics to impede or intervene) 
1.4 The Purpose of the Study 
 
The research is exploratory because SPLUMA’ (16: 2013) Tribunal had not been 
instituted and, therefore, it was exploring the implications. The study intended to 
explore how SPLUMA will affect the setting up of and the implementation of the 
Tribunal. In exploring these, the focus of the study was on locational factors (in 
terms of the actual locational relationship between the Tribunal institution and the 
municipality); it was on implementation of the tribunal institution; it was on the 
aspect of power (and interest) and the politicisation of issues as well as; issues on 
the relationship between the Tribunal and the municipal council (autonomy, 
independence, and politicisation of issues). 
1.5 The Objectives of the Study 
 
The study centrally endeavours to explore and understand the implications of the 
SPLUMA Tribunal in the context of local government (City of Johannesburg). Below 
are more specific objectives which also grant a directional framework to the study. 
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To explore the link between patrimonialism and clientelism in institutions 
and how it impacts on governance 
 
Understand whether planning interventions are in place to implement the 
incumbent Tribunal and provisions for evaluating and monitoring the 
Tribunal. 
 
Understand the effect of locational factors on governance and tribunals. 
Understand how the Tribunal will act independently and autonomous from 
the political leadership and the municipality’s vision. 
 
Understand how the separation of powers between the Tribunal and the 
political-driven mandates of the municipal council will occur. 
 
The Tribunal in SPLUMA (16: 2013) is an institution that is set within local 
government parameters. As such, there is ample research and debates related to 
institutions, government and governance. The focus of this research was to explore 
and illuminate the implications of creating and adoption of the Tribunal in SPLUMA 
within local government. The study will be very instrumental in uncovering the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Tribunal in local government and it will better aid 
in understanding the mechanisms and dominant complexities around 
(development-planning) service delivery and politics as they relate to the Tribunals. 
The study provides a better read, a first-hand account of studying and exploring the 
implementations of SPLUMA (16: 2013). 
1.6 The Limitations of the Study 
 
In undertaking this research, the study posited its own challenges. Below I outline 
the limitations of the study. 
As a newly enacted Act (16: 2013), literature on SPLUMA is very limited. 
The research is an explorative study, because the tribunals in question alongside 
SPLUMA are were not yet implemented at the writing of this research. 
The research was looking through historical lens and has included evidence from 
national reports (National Development Plan; CoGTA, SALGA and the Treasury 
local government reports). 
The utilisation of national sources means I am withdrawing away from the 
municipal source thus there is lack of information of direct (the case study). 
The research was undertaken in a short period of time, through a window of 
opportunity and thus the level of bias and subjectivity cannot be controlled. 
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The research lacks statistical validity yet has information validity. Moreover, the 
thesis is not representative of everyone.  
The research relied extensively on reflections of the provincial tribunal than the 
old planning committee functions due to access and other factors. 
1.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
The research typically included participants as it explored the implications of the 
SPLUMA Tribunal in the context of local government (City of Johannesburg). People 
were informed about the study so they were aware of the objective and 
respondents have responded voluntarily. All procedures were followed to utilise 
council (CoJ) minutes (with this I tried my utmost best to be politically sensitive). In 
analysing the content, I engaged directly with the Act (16: 2013), the reports as well 
as any publications gathered and, at all costs, I represented information without 
prejudice, or giving integrity to the research. The names of the interviewed people 
in this research are not their real. This is to protect their views and identities. The 
use of any intellectual property in facilitating this research was credited to the 
proprietor and was never used to reflect my own personal mandate or deduction. 
1.8 Outline of Chapters 
 
The research report consists of 6 chapters. The first chapter (Setting the Scene) is 
the introductory chapter and provides the introduction, background and set the 
scene for the research. The chapter also provides the research topic; the research 
questions; the study purpose as well as the main or key concepts that are utilized in 
the study. The second chapter comprises of the literature review for the wide 
variety of literature that relates to the study. It provides emerging debates, 
perspectives and arguments around the research topic as well as how they are used 
to unpack and understand the study. The chapter also includes the conceptual 
framework as a tool to analyse research data collection.  
 
The third chapter is the research methods used in the research, thus research 
methodology. These are the various instruments utilised to undertake the research, 
from content analysis to interviews. The fourth chapter is a case study introduction, 
the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. The chapter introduces the 
local government, its history and socio-economic context as well as some of its 
interventions and proposals for its regions. The fifth chapter briefly looked into the 
specific development of the SPLUMA Tribunal as an institution. It has unpacked the 
background behind the SPLUMA Tribunal. The chapter also provided a detailed 
account of the findings obtained during the research, analyse and interpret them. 
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The chapter also provides the interview responses as well as document analyses. 
The sixth chapter is the closing chapter that summarises the essence of the study 
and its findings. The chapter also makes recommendations on the implementation 
of the SPLUMA Tribunal. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: GOVERNANCE AND CLIENTELISM IN GOVERNMENT: 
AUTONOMY, POWER AND POLITICS 
2.1 Section A: Literature Review 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
According to Boote and Beile (2005: 3) reviewing literature is necessary 
precondition for doing thorough, substantive an sophisticated and this is because 
“to be useful and meaningful, education research must be cumulative; it must build 
on and learn from prior research and scholarship on the topic”. The chapter is a 
theoretical section which discusses some of the literature, which relate to the 
study/research topic. This is done through tracing governance and institutional 
theories in creating institutions and how those institutions manifest themselves. 
The chapter continues to further unpack and understand how the concepts of 
power and interest, autonomy, independence and transparency are translated in 
terms of institutions. The theories, governance and institutional, were chosen 
because they provide a solid ground and basis on which to understand institutions, 
especially within government. 
2.1.2 Governance tenements 
 
The basis of all governance theory has been collective decision and thus the term 
government. While Chhotray and Stoker (2009:3) have defined governance to be 
about “rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of 
actors or organisations and where no formal control system an dictate the terms of 
the relationship between these actors and organisations” it is also crucial to note 
that decision-making and its expressions can amount to procedures which 
eventually become the norm to which the actors and organisations adapt to. This is 
what Ostrom defines as ‘rules-in-use’ (1999:38) and purports that governance is self 
and public administration in the realms of politics in the both formal and informal 
arrangements. The very arrangements also exist to structure procedures and 
decisions as they have become a formality and thus ‘rules-in-use’. 
 
The scope of governance is in both the informal and informal institutions (Chhotray 
and Stoker, 2009) that influence the way community determines its livelihood, its 
daily contentions and decision-making about needs and wants. Therefore, 
governance is first and foremost about rules, being it formal or informal, that 
influence decision-making through structural arrangements. 
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Another element of governance is the democratic concept of ‘collective’ in decision 
making (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). This element involves matters of mutual 
control and influence. What is most crucial is that in such a mechanisation and 
institution as in governance, decisions are not guaranteed as majority voting rules 
and certain prior-agreed procedures could be imposed in order to veto individual 
decisions. As Chhotray and Stoker (2009) state, the third element of governance is 
decision-making. Decision-making is also similar to rules and collective concepts in 
that it can be both strategic and an everyday practice because a decision will have 
rules about who is to decide and how they are to do so but so too they might be 
accustomed to making the decisions regardless. 
 
The last element of governance is the “idea that in governance ‘no formal control 
system can dictate’ the relationships and outcomes” (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009:5). 
It is through governance theories that one is able to understand and better frame 
the failures and successes, in our societies, of collective decision making-based 
institutions. Therefore, all institutions of governance should at least possess all four 
of these basic elements of governance, which is collective government. 
 
2.1.3 In theory and practice: governance, power and politics 
 
The idea of the hollowing out of the state is the starting point for governance in 
politics and public administration. Rhodes (1997: ch5) supports this view stating 
that this comes a result of managerial changes. He views the local level of 
government as being fragmented because of such changes as the introduction of 
semi-independent government institutions, parastatals and public-private state 
partnerships to deliver various programmes, policies and services. The idea of the 
devolution of the state in order to promote the plurality of decision making in 
various state institutions has further propelled the fragmentation. Therefore, 
governance appears in various macro-level and micro-level state apparatuses such 
as the different level of government. In the EU, governance has been utilised as an 
analytical tool in the realms of political science to determine patterns of general 
rule (Bulmer, 1998). It is used to organise decision making and develop policies and 
programmes and as such, it is utilised to advocate for new institutionalism in order 
to better understand the European government system. 
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In such states as in the EU, governance is preferred as a tool to usher in collective 
and plural decision making among state institutions in the formation of policies. It is 
seen as focusing on ‘deliberative, non-hierarchical, multi-level and apolitical’ 
government systems than a traditional structure that views governance as involving 
the politics of interest (Hix, 1998:54). However, Chhotray and Stoker (1998) argue 
differently, they state that the dynamics of policy making and governance policies 
cannot be without power or be apolitical and as such it would be a great mistake to 
consider governance as being tied purely to social interaction. It is because of such 
views and varying perspectives on governance that the term should be understood 
in application to a context, such as in the EU. There are various schools of thought 
that stem from rationalist, socialist and cultural institutionalist that reveal the 
politics of control and interest within governance. Through these theories, one is 
able to understand the idea of governance 
 
Chhotray and Stoker (1998) dwell on the some main branch theories that 
governance theory draws. They state that while governance is about the network 
between actors and organisations (network management theory), it is also about 
delegation where with the very networks need to be managed effectively (theories 
of delegation). It is because of such ties that governance is a political sphere in the 
eyes of public interest, due to the various delegation processes that occur within 
government, its partnering semi-independent institutions, actors and organisations. 
They state that if delegation theory assumes that people respond to naturally and 
rationally to set procedures and incentives created by institutions then social 
interpretative theory disputes that view. Social interpretative theory finds that 
political and social communication is a complex process and people view things 
differently and that governance is power-interest challenge to the public society. In 
support of the social interpretative theory is the cultural institutional theory.  
 
The school of governance argues that people are creative in their thinking yet they 
are affected by the social context and as such are over powered by not only the 
social principles but by social relations that constrain or permit their choices 
(Chhotray and Stoker, 1998). The school recognises responsibilities and the blurred 
boundaries for addressing social and economic issues that are drawn from beyond 
government. The school further argues that only compatible, certain, cultures of 
social relations make the institution sustainable; Wildavsky (1987: 6) also supports 
that view when he states that “what makes order possible is that only a few 
conjunctions of shared values and their corresponding social relations are viable in 
that they are socially liveable. 
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2.1.4 Governance debates: Accountability and Politicisation 
 
While institutions are a form of government and governance, there are multiple 
debates around governance because of its political and public administration 
implications. The three main ones include: the government role in governance; 
government failure and; democracy and accountability in the practice of 
governance. Theorists such as Sorensen and Torfing (2007) and Rhodes (1997) could 
be viewed as the proponents of the government-less governance perspective. 
Rhodes (1997) refers to such a governance model, one that is without government, 
to be reflective of the continuous changes of practices and processes in governance. 
He establishes that governing does not rely on internal actors and organisations but 
those from beyond government as well. Therefore, through these various changes 
and continued networks, governing becomes a complex model that is based only on 
facilitation, bargaining and accommodation (Chhotray and Stoker, 1998). 
 
Sorensen and Torfing (2007) state that the emerging network patterns in 
governance are relatively facilitated by autonomous and ever changing actors who 
are society-based. Both theorists see governance as being steered and framed by 
government actors and political representatives. Yet, it is also possible to argue that 
these writers still give credit to an existing government as affording a role to those 
societal-based actors in their various turns. However, one could suggest that there 
is rise of more complex models of governance and approaches that do not only 
include government officials and political actors only but they are co-influenced by 
societal actors. It is within these new forms of government that a hierarchy is 
created and the main government is responsible for overseeing everything. While 
the above writers see no government, others also see a shadow government that 
controls from hindsight. Both views are two sides of a coin than conflicting 
perspectives. 
 
Governance theory also aids in understanding why institutions and government 
fails. The second debate provides strictly the view on the nature of governance 
failure. Bob Jessop (2000) has an essential view to be noted when he states that 
“failure is a central feature of all social relations” (p.30). Governance failure is 
dependent on the level of governance because of the various objectives and 
capacity of differing state-level institutions. Chhotray and Stoker (1998) noted that 
since government relies on networks on varied political and social processes then it 
is in the nature of governance to fail. 
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This is because developing networks and partnerships have high transaction costs as 
well as that some of the networks that are in charge of immediate delivery could 
lack the capacity, thereby diminishing the supply to the main network. Because of 
the various levels (local, regional, national and international) at which actors 
partake in the network communication, it almost seems impossible to reconcile 
these various responsibilities. 
 
The failures of government can also breed in the hierarchical system of job positions 
and other differences within an organisation. These differences– manager and 
junior or demographic difference – can result in endless conflicts and thus 
inefficiency. That is characteristic of market-related governance models and 
institutions. It is such kind of conflicts that lead to bargaining and, as such, 
clientelism. Therefore, such complicated and continuous conflicts suggest the need 
to assess and reassess institutional and organisational mechanisms, to find if the 
achieve the desired output (Chhotray and Stoker, 1998). 
 
The third debate dwells on the issues of democracy and accountability. March and 
Olsen (1995) state that the democratic and political systems of governance that are 
now in place have made it the norm to place accountability on individual political 
personalities, and it captures well the essence and dilemma of the contemporary 
governance model which relies on various actors. In such a governance model, 
accountability requires an active actor to hold office in order to both justify and be 
accountable to their actions. While democratic theory suggests a leadership role 
that undertakes the proposal of actions as well as being accountable to the 
enforced actions. The governance model of this form makes it more challenging to 
take up office in such demanding conditions (Bovens, 1998). 
 
The difficulty with failing institutions is because a model of political accountability 
has not been developed but the actors who hold office need to be accountable for 
their actions (Pierre and Peters, 2005). It is because of such lack of development 
that there have been issues about institutional democratic accountability in 
governance and this is also because accountability is not institution specific but it 
must be flexible for various institutions and their assorted policies. Pierre and 
Peters (2005), in opposition to Rhodes (1997) and others, argue that accountability 
requires a focus on state institutions. They argue that the only way the state can be 
brought back to guarantee public interest and legitimise democratic institution is 
through a focus on state institutions themselves. This is an assumption that 
accountability can be guaranteed by simply imposing state control governance on 
the public.  
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The fundamental problem, as Chhotray and Stoker (1998: 50) argue, is that the “… 
state is the state. An institution defined by its monopoly of institutional coercion 
may learn new techniques but cannot disguise from citizens its essential core”. 
While the state and its institutions are agents of collective agency but it is also a 
tool of control and coercion. Therefore, it is a rigid tool that is understood by 
various social, political and business stakeholders (business, civil society, social 
group, etc.) as a control motor. In order to better understand accountability in 
institutions, Bovens (1998) and Rhodes (1997) agree that there is a persistent need 
to understand the basic tenements of accountability so to be able to configure 
better solutions.   
 
While accountability may about monitoring and evaluation governing processes 
(Bovens, 1998), a test that many writers feel governance is failing so much, Rhodes 
(1997) has actually suggested that governance can actually offer some 
accountability in the policy area through the interaction between non-state and 
state actors. The challenges in governing and governance that are faced by 
contemporary institutions have found a deeper complexity in the public 
administration and political science fields. 
 
The various views that propose ways in which institutional democracy and good 
governance could be achieved range from general political science literature of 
rationalist thinking to that of governance and institutional theory as cultural 
institutionalism. The debates showed how varied perspectives can be utilised to 
understand governance in different contexts. This is because, while politics and 
public administration may be the home of governance, other literature exists that 
proves otherwise. As such, it is important to understand how governance and 
institutional theory unpack and frame state institutions such as tribunals, especially 
when it comes to the politicisation of issues and accountability of actors who hold 
office. 
2.1.5 Social notions: Power and Autonomy 
 
In order to explore and understand politics and institutions, Bevir (1999) used a 
Foucauldian approach to understanding power and government and how they re-
create political institutions from basic traditional structuralism. Literature on 
traditional structuralism rejects the notion that a society is understood by its 
functional and institutional setup but rather that every social arrangement is based 
on some source of power, a conceptual structure of sorts.  
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Therefore, from a Foucauldian perspective, institutions should not be understood 
from their rational-legal status but rather from their normative ideas, values, 
principles and practices on daily operations (Bevir, 1999). 
The author states that the particular informal interactions between actors inform 
and guide individual behaviour and acts a framework for the implementation and 
evaluation of initiatives. Therefore, institutional policymaking and decision-making 
is borne out less formal structures and procedures but simple interactions and 
social relations (Bevir, 1999). If one carries a longitudinal study on government 
institutions, they would be able to understand that they change from when they 
were created and that they are modified by the actors which operate in them. This 
meant that the study of institutions, of politics, of power and influence, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, would be the study of people, processes and their 
activities (Bevir, 1999). The focus shifts more to the actors which shape, implement 
policies, thereby those who hold power.  
An essential part to the evolution of institutions is their re-creation or re-institution, 
because the addition of certain actors within the institutions would influence the 
power relations and the way in which such an institution operates. Institutions are 
forever in a state of flux, and are a consequence of multiple re-creations through 
various processes and activities (Bevir, 1999). 
According to Hexmoor (2002), the accountability of actors within an institution is 
also influenced through interaction of actors in a “sub-field of multi-agent systems” 
(p.323) and thus embeds such social notions as autonomy, control, power and 
dependence. Government officials are agents and as such, there are power 
relations within institutions of government. Hexmoor (2002) says that there exists a 
complimentary relationship between power and autonomy, especially within 
institutions. This is because actors or agents can influence and command one 
another because of the power bestowed on them through their roles within the 
institution. The interaction of various actors or agents within an organisation 
creates and further nourishes the organised autonomy-power relationship and 
culture.  
He further states that autonomy can be both relative and absolute. The relatively 
autonomous actor is one who has an option to choose the manner at which to be 
influenced while an absolute one would have the preference and choice to deny the 
influence. In a group situation such as large organisation, societies and institutions, 
lack of autonomy can shift to dependence. Yet, the individual actor’s dependence or 
lack of autonomy could be linked to general dependence on the larger group than 
that of a few powerful actors within the group.  
16 
 
Therefore, in any setting of large groups, absolute autonomy and power cannot 
exist because all actors have relative power over one another. 
2.1.6 Institutional theory 
In political science, institutions were framed around constitutional law and moral 
philosophy. In creating institutions, the focus is more on the arrangement and the 
legal framework of such governance structures and agencies. As depicted by Bill & 
Hardgrave (1981), institutional theorists at the turn of the 19th century had 
characterized institutions in a similar way. They were all concerned with the formal 
structure and the legal framework. Secondly, they emphasized the arrangement of 
political systems against the administrative background. Lastly, they were 
concerned about the completeness of an institution as a structure with all its actors 
and legal system intact.  
According to Scott (2001), these types of institutions had not apparent future 
because they were seen as complete. However, they would be followed by 
institutions that focused more on moral philosophy than structure alone, 
institutions that prioritised principles and values. In the realm of political science, 
students and authors focused on how these different institutions affected political 
party formation, voting behaviour and public opinion (Scott, 2001). The work of 
Herbert Spencer ushered in a new way of sociological institutions. Many sociologists 
studied institutions through his ideas. In sociology, institutions required to adapt to 
their own context than be framed purely by legal systems and the completeness of 
its actors.  
They saw an institution as comprising of an idea and a structure whereby the 
concept represents the function of the institution and the structure personifies it. 
More importantly, while many sociologists would later detach the early 
explanations of what institutions were, they all embraced the idea that institutions 
should serve the society (Scott, 2001). Therefore, in the last few decades, the 
writings on institutions have reflected on the hierarchy of actors in an organisation 
(individuals, communities, business, societies, groups, etc.) and also on the 
functions of such actors in the social sphere as governed by multiple systems of life. 
According to Cooley (1956), great institutions such as churches, courts, the 
government and family customs may seem independent but they are not. He states 
that they developed through interactions among the institutions’ actors and, as 
such, there is a certain level of interdependence between self (individual) and 
structure (institution). These ideas agree to the notion that institutions only exist to 
be carried by social beings.  
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According to Scott (2001), creating institutions will give rise to new practices and 
rules as derived from the process and conditions of creating it. Therefore, there is a 
persistent need to change regulatory procedures because of the new requirement 
to align the institution and the society’s needs. This is largely because in order to 
create productive institutions, the government needs to provide social and 
employee benefits that do no harm economic growth but also not promote 
patriotism. 
2.1.7 Bureaucracy: Power and Influence in Institutions 
Over the past 2 decades, there was a development of key debates around who 
controls the United States bureaucracy. There were different perspectives from all 
angles with some theorist arguing that the president presides over the bureaucracy, 
some stating that the Congress has control, others emphasised the law (legal arm 
and courts) has power yet some still found that the bureaucracy had a certain level 
of autonomy over all of the above. According to Hammond & Knott (1996: 119), 
there’s a “formal model of multi-institutional policy-making that illuminates several 
key aspects of this debate. The model shows that there are conditions under which 
an agency will have considerable autonomy and conditions under which it will have 
virtually none. The model also shows that when an agency lacks autonomy, control 
of the agency usually cannot be attributed to just one institution.”  
To use this American example, the control of a bureaucracy could be fought over for 
by Congress, the Republic and the president. If such a situation occurs, a secretary 
that is employed for office by the president could be fired by the president. Such a 
situation would mean the secretary owes their loyalty to the president. Hammond 
& Knott (1996) state that power relationships that occur in institutions are always 
interdependent and arranged in a bureaucratically fashion. Congress provides 
authority for the security of administrative staff, and such authority could only be 
extracted through a concession to various demands as set by the bureaucracy. 
Although, meeting the requirements to extract such an authority meant bowing to 
the president’s initial needs (Hammond & Knott, 1996). 
The literature on bureaucratic control presents various and varied arguments. There 
are authors who argue for bureaucratic autonomy, those who are for Congress 
domination, those who state the presidential supremacy, those who regard law (the 
courts) as the supreme body and those who argue that the bureaucracy is jointly 
controlled by all of the above.  
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In the quest for bureaucratic autonomy, an agency is stated to be an autonomous 
policy-making body because of three main reasons: the president’ and Congress’ 
attitude toward the agency; information sharing between the agency and its control 
centre and; differences and conflicts among various principals in control centre who 
control the agency. It is argued that the president lacks interest in regulatory 
agencies and as such, his influence in such kind of agencies is very low (Wilson, 
1980; Weingast, 1981). These arguments and their observations are paralleled by 
those of the Congress as well. On the part of the Congress, it is argued that it does 
not partake on regular policy reviews over the policy making agencies and this is 
because the policies have little effect on the electoral stance. 
On information sharing, Hammond & Knott (1996), through a Weberian view, find 
that the political economy of institutional information sharing depends largely on 
the relationship between the interested actors. It is because of such lack of interest 
from the president and the Congress that there will be hidden information 
(whereby the institution controls secret information or has technical knowledge 
which the Congress or president does not have) and there will also be hidden 
movements (where by an institution takes action and decisions that are not easily 
traceable by the Congress and the president (Hammond & Knott, 1996).  
The literature on institutions and agencies suggests that institutions can assume 
independence from both the Congress and the president by balancing out their 
interest. While this does not suggest that institutions can be immune from politics, 
it does however recommend that there is a way of balancing acts such that power 
and control by Congress and the president over the institution is minimised albeit 
competing demands and continued conflict of ideas. 
On the contrary, there is an argument that opposes the idea that bureaucratic or 
institutional control is about legislative indifference to policy agencies. Fiorina 
(1979) states that the elected political leadership controls government and gives us 
the kind of government it wants. As such, the political leadership maintain a type of 
government status that is deliberately made to be susceptible to political 
intervention, not only to the entire membership but sub-committees and 
individuals as well (Fiorina, 1979). The argument here is that political leadership, or 
Congress in the American case, can get their ideal policies in place by imposing 
control mechanisms on policy-making institutions (Weingast, 1981). These 
mechanisms include budget increases to those institutions if they perform 
accordingly or as desired as well sanctions, budget cuts or organizational 
restrictions if they do not perform well. On the same tune as those that argue for 
Congress control over government are those who notice administrative procedures 
as a control mechanism.  
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As Hammond & Knott (1996) noted, there are procedures that force institutions to 
reveal information to the elected officials or congressmen. These procedures can be 
in the form of public hearings prior to adoption of various policies or regulations on 
decision-making processes and who can participate in them. This is one way of 
reducing an institutions independence and its ability to make own decisions without 
political interference.  
In a more inclusive perspective, McCubbins (1985), Noll and Weingast (1987) state 
that such kind of procedures does not serve only the elected political leadership but 
the president, yet it is without a doubt that the agency or institution lacks 
autonomy in both cases. The argument that supports political leadership to be in 
control is not enough to argue that institutions lack autonomy because institutions 
are subservient to the set procedures but Congress is dominant as described. The 
other view is that of the president controlling government.  
This view continues to exist alongside the views that there is political dominance 
over the government and those that see the institution as independent. Although 
there exists an argument that political leadership controls the government, authors 
such as Moe (1987), Hammond & Ishiyama (1995) oppose that argument.  
According to Moe (1987), presidents have always had the upper hand in deciding 
the appointed personnel into their executive council and this gives the president 
the right to build their own administration. Hammond & Ishiyama (1995) have 
noted, at least in the US from 1945 to 1974, especially for the Federal Trade and 
Communications Commissions, that presidents had more control over government 
appointees than any other actor within government. This is supported by multiple 
studies on agency and Congress movements within government. Hammond & Knott 
(1996) have also noted that many decisions in government had to be made against 
a budget estimates that is finalised by the president. The authors also cite divisions 
within the political leadership in governance, that when the leadership is in conflict, 
their power against the president weakens there by granting him/her the power to 
govern and control institutions and policies to his favour.  
The president, ultimately, is able to manipulate procedures even when political 
leadership may block some of his initiatives. A fourth view, literature body, has seen 
courts as controlling government and not that the government is independent or 
being controlled by the elected political leadership or the president.  According to 
proponents of this body of literature, there are procedural and substantive 
constraints to governance and, as such, no human is above the law. As Hammond & 
Knott (1996) noted, judicial doctrine and administrative law create procedures that 
are to be followed by institutions.  
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It is these very procedures that will ultimately direct policy choices. Courts, through 
administrative law, tend to require public hearings and that decisions should be 
made in fairness. This tendency, while it provides for participation of interested 
parties in decision-making, creates the perception that courts control the 
bureaucracy. The courts are also able to make judgments against the president, the 
political leadership or institutions based solely on the Constitution. 
Lastly, the literature on who controls the government or bureaucracy, have seen a 
joint control mechanism that is hidden in the daily operation of the bureaucracy. 
This is because the literature differs from various perspectives and the evidence 
posited could be interpreted differently. Empirically, the president, Congress and 
institutions all have joint control over the government yet it varies from matter to 
matter.  
These efforts, when looked at collectively, highlight important aspects of control on 
policy making in government and how power could be shared among various actors 
and be interpreted differently. It highlights important tools of power and influence 
that each actor, be it the president or the institution or the elected political 
leadership or the courts, can utilise. 
The literature also suggests that there is a complex relationship between these 
various actors within government, and that the very complexity might have given 
rise to the different views on who actually controls the government. Therefore, one 
could conclude that the complex relationship makes it difficult to develop a theory 
around the control of government. The lack of such a theory has, therefore, created 
a greater difficulty to understand the complex relations in policy and decision-
making processes in governance. It has made it difficult to interpret any study or 
evidence that tries to understand who controls the government.  
The studies, the view and the different bodies of literature that argue for and 
against government control from various perspectives, have specified that the 
nature of government is a complex process which cannot be understand from 
general body of literature based on different case studies and experiences. In 
summation of this section and in response to the question “Who controls the 
government?” the control of government or the bureaucracy is a sum of the 
interactions of all those who take part in governing. That is, it is the function of the 
president, the members of parliament (or congress) and the civil society. For some 
institutions, these interactions can lead to far more transparency and greater 
autonomy and to others it can lead to far less autonomy.  
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Autonomy and control, therefore, are contingent matters, and there is no 
justification to expect all institutions or agencies to be compelled to the same 
degree. However, one cannot point out any one actor or group of actors or agency 
that takes primary responsibility for the control of government. 
2.1.8 Governance in Norway: On transparency and Independence 
Norges Bank, in Norway, is one many institutions that are kept independent from 
elected political leadership, and Professor Andreas Follesdal writes on this political 
independence. The institutions that are kept away from political influence include 
the international courts, the Supreme Court, researchers and free media (Follesdal, 
2010). The body of literature that writes on political intervention is faced against 
arguments against super transparency and lack of information sharing. According to 
Follesdal (2010), Norges Bank, as a specific case, combines both independence and 
transparency in creation of its decision-making bias.  
Norway is a democratic country and all citizens are equal yet in government, some 
parties are shielded from political control. Is it really possible to be both transparent 
and protected from political interference and control? Follesdal has noted various 
arguments that are pro-independence and that that are pro-transparency, and uses 
these to understand why the Norges Bank is reflective of both. In arguing for 
political independence, Follesdal (2010) states that independent institutions are a 
critical requirement to watch out for and prevent abuse of power by either the law, 
the parliament or the government.  
This is to ensure that all parties act within their allowed powers. In fulfilling a 
watchdog role, there is a persistent need to have a free media and allow rigorous 
free research that is independent from the control and power of the government. 
Norges Bank, as such, cannot be justified simply by that watchdog role but also 
there is a need to supervise central banks (Follesdal, 2010). Secondly, independent 
institutions are seen as equal supervisors to other bodies. While the independent 
institutions do not necessitate the need for independence, they are required to 
keep check of other institutions. Therefore, it is argued, the general community will 
have greater confidence in not only themselves, but institutions and the 
independent bodies as well.  
The argument is in favour of independent institutions because they believe that 
decisions that impact on citizens need to be made with confidence and the well-
being of mind (Follesdal, 2010). Therefore, it justifies the need to have the free 
media, free research and multiple other bodies, including the Norges Bank, to be 
independent.  
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The Norges Bank justifies its transparency and independence because it seeks such 
independent bodies with common knowledge and confidence-building strategies to 
be able to function properly (Follesdal, 2010). 
Thirdly, it is argued that some tasks require keen expertise and specialist skills that 
other citizens do not have. Therefore, in order to have an effective solution to 
governance matters, there is special need to protect those very specialists that 
possess such expertise as required by government (Majone, 1994). The argument 
justifies the need to protect such skilled specialists as - only they can undertake 
such specialized tasks as reaching inflation target – economists (Follesdal, 2010).  
It is such specialized tasks that require specialists that have been used to defend the 
need for the Norges Bank to be independent from political control in Norway. A 
fourth point of view that argues for political independence is that the society 
requires a long-term perspective than the political-term elected representatives 
(Follesdal, 2010). This argument is justified by the long-term needs of the citizens 
and not on the related power abuse. Therefore, Norges Bank, free research, and 
free media necessitate their independence from political control because of 
supervision, expertise, confidence-building and long-term planning (Follesdal, 
2010). In a democratic setting, these arguments are a limitation on democratic 
autonomy, one must be aware of the effect on the general democracy of the 
country. While the above might be in favour of such independent bodies or 
institutions, there are, at the same time, arguments that point toward transparency, 
especially of Norges Bank (central bank). 
According to Steigum (2005), Norges Bank, as an independent institution, needs to 
transparent because it needs to be maintain confidence within the society, it needs 
to be a long-term expert and it has to be effective. Because it is such an 
independent institution, it has other non-independent institutions as agenda setters 
but it has to clearly communicate its plans and procedures to the public as the 
central bank. Secondly, in order to be more democratic, the Bank’s transparency 
can increase communication and thus democratic governance. Thirdly, in order to 
safeguard confidence and eliminate doubt, the bank is required to be clear about its 
operation activities, about its appointments, about its direction to target financial 
matters and everything else (Follesdal, 2010). 
However, there are those who are against the need for Norges Bank and other 
institutions’ independence. As Follesdal (2010) continues, the need for 
independence and transparency does not place the Bank in any better financial 
status or cutting government budgets. However, he states that taxes could always 
be raised from the politicians end.  
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In defence against the argument to require expertise that only certain individuals or 
institutions have, Follesdal (2010) states that these type of appointments and 
decisions should be taken by elected officials of whom can be held accountable and 
responsible. In a democratic setting, decision-making is finalised only through 
hearing all sides of the story and as such the people should not have confidence in 
the political independence of the central bank (Norges Bank). This is because it is 
necessary to pick out controversy and ensure a broad consensus after all (Follesdal, 
2010).  
While transparency is an essential tool to ensure that the bank is more farsighted 
than the political views, it is also important to consider the possibility that the 
Bank’s executives may take decisions that may warrant mixed motives and not 
consensus. Therefore, it is important that the bank represents varied views, albeit 
not being political. In conclusion, with an independent bank, a free media and free 
research, there is a certain level of credibility and an increased possibility of holding 
politicians accountable for their acts. However, there are many other actors (social 
groups) that should play a necessary role in enabling an active democratic state in 
Norway to maintain an accountable and independent central bank.  
 
The very politicians and the courts also play a vital role. The literature of Norwegian 
central has allowed and shed light on institutions that are politically independent 
and how the can be open to public scrutiny for not being democratic. It thus 
enables an understanding and assessment of institutions with political interference, 
intervention or control and those without. 
2.1.9 Good Governance: Rule of Law, Transparency and Accountability 
 
While governance is a thorn in many an institution, because of the assumed issues it 
brings with, there is a body of literature with ample studies of what good 
governance is. In order to achieve such a feat, the rule of law, transparency and 
accountability are the required ingredients. According to this body of literature, 
there are certain goals to be achieved, certain key obstacles to be overcome and 
they all include institutions and participation. According to Johnston (2002), the 
goals identified include transparency; vertical and horizontal accountability; 
incentives and embedded autonomy. However, on the challenges, there is a need to 
supervise administrative and political representatives (checks and balances) and 
provide a place for politics within the good governance system. Good governance 
has always been threatened by excessive regulation and legislation; by short-term 
policies as well as the lack to assess public opinion.  
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Therefore, there is a persistent need for full participation, a broad spectrum 
representation of all stakeholders including social groups, civil society and 
businesses (Johnston, 2002). For institutions, there is a need to have clear and 
understandable procedures and information in order to facilitate better public 
hearings and consultations. Participation is a key process of good governance 
because it is a form of information-sharing (public education) but it is also a 
measure of responsibility through continued communication with the citizens. 
Therefore, the emphasis is not so much on procedures and processes yet on the 
common goal of being accountable and responsibility for the better of the public 
good. In a democratic setup, good governance becomes a less tedious path because 
the state is not an omnipotent structure and the political leadership is not the rule 
of law.  
However, the rule of law, accountability and transparency become outcomes of a 
democratic process that is driven by committed partnership of groups and interests 
within the society (Johnston, 2002). Therefore, good governance is a tool in which 
both the state and the society frame a partnership, one that is lasting because of 
strong institutions. According to Johnston (2002), where the rule of law is strong, 
people will uphold its virtues because also they have a stake in its effectiveness. The 
author supports the need of a free yet responsible press as well as an informed and 
active society. As a co-efficient of transparency, government should be clear about 
its operations, procedures and decisions but that may slow down administrative 
processes due to lengthy consultations.  
It is also of great import to note that transparency has its own deep limitations, 
because it increases the security issues as well as the issues around the privacy of its 
own citizens. Yet, without transparency, good governance means nothing 
(Johnston, 2002). According to this body of literature, accountability is a formal 
matter that is instilled in the institutional setup of any institutions. It is a form of 
procedure, checks and balances that are built into the setup of institutions from the 
creation yet they require an active citizenry. Accountable institutions are the ideal 
product of commitment from all stakeholders, including the free media, the courts 
and opposition parties.  
This is because a responsible institution will be required to follow mandates and will 
have pressure from all those it governs with or for. The answer to good governance, 
have to fundamentally do with justice and democratization. However, while 
democracy was sought as a means to an end of justice, it is of great import to 
understand that competitive politics and administrative transparency are necessary 
tools to good governance (Johnston, 2002).  
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Therefore, it is ultimately about the participation of all those involved than 
protection of some (i.e. the media or research) that is essential in maintaining the 
healthy competition between politics and economy and, as such, good governance. 
Johnston (2002) sums it up well in his statement that “State and society must be 
able to influence each other, within limits: policies must respond to social realities 
and demands, just as participation must be subject to the rule of law.” (p5). 
According to United Nations ESCAP (2007), establishing a good governance 
structure requires an analysis of the formal and informal actors that involved in the 
decision-making processes and the process by which those decisions are 
implemented.  As with Johnston (2002), UN ESCAP states that the actors involved 
include the government and others will depend on the type of government involved 
in such a situation. The basic tenements of good governance are it is accountable, 
transparent, responsive, efficient and effective, participatory, collaborative, 
inclusive and that it is based on the rule of law. When a structure has all the 
tenements they can minimise corruption, involve the minority as well as the poor in 
the society (UN ESCAP, 2007).  
Good governance is an achievement all institutions should strive for in order to 
cater for all stakeholders in a state. The urban poor play a critical role because not 
only are they organised but they may be exploited and could be suffering the most. 
The middle class people have potential to bring about change in the status quo of 
government and governance however disorganized, less informed and educated 
they may be. The elite people shape communities in both informal and formal 
through relationships and business structures. They are well organised to partake in 
matters concerning governance of an area.  
However, these groups or social classes are not to participate alone in achieving 
good governance, they require a committed and transparent relationship from the 
upper echelons of government (key decision-makers); from elected political 
representatives; the media; the groups of interest; the informal sector; the small-
scale entrepreneurs and everyone else (NGOs, CBOs, CSOs, private sector) in the 
society. In governance, participation should be of both men and women, to increase 
gender equality, and can be done through representatives or institutions of certain 
interests. In order for an institution to achieve good governance, it needs to be both 
collaborative and inclusive. Secondly, the rule of law, unlike law and formal 
legislations, is enforced impartially and informally. Therefore, the rule of law is a fair 
legal framework that can be a backbone to governance (UN ESCAP, 2007). The third 
tenement is transparency, and this should means that procedures are followed in 
decision-making and that information from the state and its institutions is freely 
accessible (and understandable) to all those will be affected.  
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Another characteristic is responsiveness, and this means that institutions should be 
responsive to all stakeholders within a respectable timeframe. While being 
collaborative, especially about public consultations, institutions need to be 
consensus oriented. Therefore, despite the multitudes of interested actors and their 
views, institutions need to mediate those varied interests and arrive at possible 
conclusion that fits all stakeholders. Being consensus oriented also means that an 
institution of good governance will see in both short- and long-term perspectives 
and how to achieve its set goals. In order to achieve its set goals, good governance 
requires that an institutions and its controlling actors understand the context for 
such a given society in which it governs (UN ESCAP, 2007).  
In order to be inclusive, all members of a society must feel to have a stake in the 
operations of a society, its government and institutions. This means an opportunity 
must be given to all in developing a society, be it through public forums or 
development programs.  
In good governance, institutions will only be effective if all procedures followed 
meet the needs of its citizens with all the resources at their disposal, there by being 
sustainable and efficient. Accountability, like transparency, is good measure and a 
requirement of good governance in institutions. Not only in the government but 
almost any and every organization should accountable to its stakeholders. Generally 
for institutions, accountability is owed to the general public and all those who will 
be affected by the decisions taken. Therefore, “accountability cannot be enforced 
without transparency and the rule of law” (UN ESCAP, 2007: 3).  
Despite all the basic tenements or characteristics of good governance as described 
by both the United Nations ESCAP (2007) and Johnston (2002), it is very clear that 
good governance is a notion which is almost impossible to achieve in its totality. 
Because there are some countries in which democracy is still futile, some of which 
are communist, socialist, capitalist and so forth. It is because of these differences 
and other financial, social and political complexities that appear from one state to 
another that good governance becomes a difficult ideal. However, it is also clear 
that in order to be better, the state and its institutions should strive toward good 
governance. 
2.1.10 Clientelism in Social Programs: the case of Balsa Familia in Brazil 
Good governance falls part of a greater literature on politics and development 
studies, and this is mainly because it is a great challenge for developing countries to 
provide services to the poor without patron-client systematic networks.   
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According to Sugiyama & Hunter (2013), it is especially difficult because in many 
countries, the national authority has oversight over local programmes and also 
because some of the programs that are created to promote the poor’s autonomy 
often strengthen the patron-client relationship, thus the poor’s dependence on 
those programs. As a cornerstone of development, it is an important goal of good 
governance to develop ways in which the society can benefit from social, economic 
and other development programs without clientelism. 
The literature on social science provides examples of social programs and 
institutions that conform to governmental policies than those of patron-client 
politics “where by voters trade political support for particularistic goods and 
services” (Sugiyama & Hunter, 2013: 43). Clientele relationships are normally a by-
product of government programs that are entailed with municipal co-operation and 
political intervention in mind.  
From 1889 to 1930, Brazil was a formal constitutional democracy. The country’s 
status then changed to Republican Constitution from the year 1891. Between 1983-
1926, the Brazilian government was in hands of several movements, including the 
military and the civilians. The control by the army and the public society led to the 
development of the country’s industrial and agricultural sector.  It was then taken 
under military dictatorship from the year 1964 until 1985 but has been undergoing 
a phase of democratization ever since. One of the most significant problems in the 
country has been unequal distribution of income and wealth. This problem is closely 
tied to the President Lula da Silva’s term. This is because the president has been 
accused of corruption and the abuse of power but has been kept in power due to 
his term’s achievements, including fighting unemployment.  
One of his achievements is the poverty reduction initiative through such social 
programs as the Balsa Familia. The import in the history of Brazil is because South 
Africa is also a constitutional democracy and has continued to have such similar 
issues that are linked to political constituencies. This makes the application of such 
literature on institutions and governance from Brazil to be compatible and 
comparable with that of South Africa. Moreover, the model of governance between 
South Africa and Brazil is also similar. While Lula was succeeded by Dilma Rousseff, 
the Balsa Familia social program continues to operate in many communities of 
Brazil as a method of job creation, poverty reduction, and social inclusion amid 
reports of corruption and social injustice.  
The case of Balsa Familia is one of many national government programs in Brazil 
(and many other developing countries) that has been created to serve the public 
and has been successful in doing without any major pitfalls.  
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Research was undertaken to determine whether Balsa Familia was indeed clear of 
clientelism. This is also because Balsa Familia occurs in a country where there are 
over 5000 municipalities that are not properly organised or capacitated either 
(Sugiyama & Hunter, 2013). The researcher initially posited that good governance is 
not an impossible achievement because they believed that solid government 
commitment, transparent policy design and implementation as well as a strong 
technical capacity to roll out programs were the necessary tools required. As the 
largest CCT (conditional cash transfer) program in the world, the Balsa Familia 
program aimed at improving the health and education of low-income youth as well 
as alleviating poverty (Hall, 2008).  
The program falls as part of a band of the Brazil national government’s initiatives 
that aid citizens with below living wage incomes and offers all the basic needs and 
services for free. While most research on CCT programs usually studies their 
relationship with political elections, some studies have already noted the positive 
relationship between the Balsa Familia program and the associated presidential 
candidate Luiz Silva (Fried, 2012). This positive correlation is embedded in local 
municipal politics as the local officials are the ones aiding the poor to apply and gain 
access to the program, there by granting client-patron relationships possible.  
The majority of direct interactions in the Balsa Familia program occur at the local 
level of government and as such a survey was taken in areas whereby the people 
would most likely be exposed to political manipulation (low income people and 
residential location – socioeconomic status). This is because if it occurs that there 
was some manipulation then all efforts at good governance would be defeated as 
clientelism destroys participation and transparency. The report on that research 
showed very high levels of vote buying by local officials yet such evidence could not 
be released on the general Balsa Familia report because not many citizens were 
willing to verbal report such instances (Sugiyama & Hunter, 2013). 
Secondly, in correlation to local conditions, most offers for votes in exchange for 
goods and other services have been reported, and this is largely because of a trend 
of negative responses from previous client-patron relationships. However, the 
research results also showed signs of no clientelism, where by the respondents 
stated that the Balsa Familia program was not utilised for buying votes or any 
political manipulation, therefore it is clean (Sugiyama & Hunter, 2013). Given that 
client-patron relationships can be widespread in such kind of programs, it is 
important that the Balsa Familia program was received differently by different 
people.  
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The reality of the program is that vote buying is evident in many yet they do not 
acknowledge it and most of the respondents did not agree to vote buying because 
they felt they would be withdrawn from the program (Women’s Group, 2009). 
There was clear sense and knowledge of what the officials can deliver and therefore 
it was easier for the local respondents to notice when services got to others earlier 
than they did to them. 
However, the client-patron relationships in Brazil’s Balsa Familia program are well-
organized because not solid evidence can be concluded upon the program’s 
clientelism. Drawing on experiences of cases like the one of Balsa Familia one is able 
to conclude that well-operated initiatives that do not enhance clientelism are really 
hard to find in the developing world. This is also because the poor generally lacks 
understanding of what client-patron relationships are like and some have such kind 
of networks as a way of life.  
The Balsa Familia is one of many government-initiate social programs that continue 
to give politicians an opportunity to strengthen their clientele. The program is huge 
and impacts on a great popular, therefore it becomes difficult to track its 
operations, especially in a country with 5000 municipalities that are not well 
capacitated (Sugiyama & Hunter, 2013). Moreover, while the study was not a full-
scale and rigorous to be able to detect all variables that expose programs to 
clientelism, it was able to suggest some preliminary ideas around clientelism. The 
case study reveals that national government control over such kind of programs 
would fare better at avoiding clientelism. There is a need for a central role in rolling 
out these kinds of programs.  
2.1.11 Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance 
On a paper prepared for the USAID (United States Agency for International 
Development), authors Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) provide an analysis of 
clientelism and patrimonialism as well as strategies to tackling, especially in 
institutions that roll out government-assisted and capacity programs. Developing 
countries continue reform yet much focus has been on formal institutionary 
processes and procedures, which is different to ground operations and how those 
formal rules are received by the societies. In many cases, there are informal systems 
of patrimonialism and clientelism that distort public service delivery, stifle 
development and public participation, undermine economic progress, discourage 
investment, subvert the rule of law, and encourage corruption (Brinkerhoff & 
Goldsmith, 2002). 
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In order to understand governance and the relationship between its formal and 
informal systems, the authors examine the concepts of clientelism, patrimonialism, 
democratic governance and rational-legal government systems. Firstly, while the 
formal notions governance involve procedures, public administration and public 
decision-making, it is crucial to note that the informal systems cannot be easily 
documented as they heavily include the socioeconomic, sociocultural and socio-
historical interactions between the people their government. The informal systems 
are not easily noticed because they appear to the natural civilian’s view as helping 
one another, an often practiced norm in any society.  
Every government, and governance, has dual character whereby the formal meets 
the informal. It is because of this dual character that patrimonialism and clientelism 
are born. The behaviour of helping each other is unlawful when it takes place within 
formal, organised institutional structures of government because everything is 
supposed to happen on merit (McCourt, 2000). According to Brinkerhoff & 
Goldsmith (2002) the term clientelism, “a complex chain of bonds between political 
patrons or bosses and their individual clients or followers” (p2.), can take a variety 
of forms and is applicable in both urban and rural settings.  
Clientelism follows a problem-solving notion and logic because it is usually for those 
with limited access to resources and it flourishes as a power relationship in 
environments which are politically or economically insecure. Typical, the needy are 
driven into these client-patron relations as a way of finding a solution for the 
livelihoods.  
According Kaufman’s (1974: 285), clientelism has certain characteristics:  
a) the relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status; 
b) it is based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is a self-regulating 
form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends 
on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods 
and services to each other and which ceases once the expected 
rewards fail to materialize; 
c) the relationship is particularistic and private, anchored only loosely in 
public law or community norms. 
Clientelistic relationships, therefore, rest more rational economics than plain 
loyalty, a type of an uneven mutually beneficial relationship between the patron 
and the client. Clientele relations are used in studies to understand general politics 
of governance. 
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In an ideal democratic society, institutions adhere to all procedures and political 
power is fairly contested through regular and just processes. This is a transparent 
process wherewith client-patron relations do not exists and policy making is focused 
on transparent and accountable delivery of services. However, the difference 
between an ideal democratic society and a clientelistic are very large because 
clientelism can manifest itself informally within a democratic setting (Brinkerhoff & 
Goldsmith, 2002), as shown in the table below. 
Table 1.1: Continuum of Political decision making systems (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 
2002: 5). 
Clientelistic Democratic 
Authority is personal, resides with 
individuals 
Authority is institutional, resides with 
official roles 
Personal enrichment and 
aggrandizement are core values 
Rule of law, fair elections and majority 
rule are core values 
Leaders tend to monopolize power and 
are unaccountable for their actions 
Leaders share power with others and 
are 
accountable for actions 
Leaders hold onto power by providing 
personal favours that secure loyalty of 
key followers 
Leaders share power with others and 
are 
accountable for actions 
Policy decisions are taken in secret 
without public discussion or 
involvement 
Policy decisions are taken in the open 
after public discussion and review 
Political parties are organized around 
personalities 
Political parties are organized around 
stated programs 
Civil society is fragmented and 
characterized by vertical links 
Civil society is deep and characterized 
by horizontal links 
Decision making standards are tacit 
and procedures are impossible to 
follow from outside 
Decision making standards are explicit 
and procedures are transparent 
Supporters’ interests guide decisions Public interest guides decisions 
Extensive scope exists for patronage 
appointments 
Limited exists scope for patronage 
appointments 
No regular procedures exist regarding 
leaders’ replacement 
Regular procedures exist regarding 
leaders’ replacement 
 
A democracy does not imply strict rules and procedures or authoritarianism yet 
allows for freedom of various rights and, as such, the rules and procedures that 
apply to democratic institutions do not mean there is a strict rule to be followed 
about candidate politicians can communicate or interact with the general public.  
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Therefore, legislators are able to lure government programs into their own 
communities in exchange for political votes, and this is the most common form of 
clientelism. At the engine of clientelism is patrimonialism, where with the patrons 
practice nepotism by giving out jobs to those they prefer (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 
2002). This is termed patrimonial administration. Many developing countries have 
set constitution and/or legislation on public administration yet many continue to 
operate on deep-rooted foundations of patrimonialism. In administration, there 
exists neopatrimonialism, a continued culture of patrimonialism that co-exists with 
rational-legal systems (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002).  
According to Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2002), the five socioeconomic phenomena 
that are associated with patrimonialism and clientelism are: corruption, weak 
implementation, perpetuation of poverty, social exclusion and rent-seeking. Rent-
seeking when patrons alter public policy and systematic procedures in order to 
continue benefitting themselves. This is a prevalent disease in politics as people 
utilise their inside contacts to serve themselves. This is common for business people 
and their political contacts in government where they want to share the economic 
pie of a society including subsidies, tax rebates, permits and tariff rebates.  
Procurement in government institutions can also be a form of rent because officials 
may overcharge whatever items being bought and accumulate the extra charged 
amount. This leaves a bad economic situation, and promotes government initiatives 
that are not best for society simply because they offer economic rent for those in 
charge. Closely related with rent-seeking is corruption, which is the condition that 
occurs when public positions are being abused in the quest for private gain. The 
activity involves taking advantage of the power inherited (be it electoral or 
administrative) to advance private interests (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). Similar 
to rent, it often takes an official to embezzle money or utilise office infrastructure in 
order to generate personal extra income. A by-product of corruption in government 
activities hurts the economic system of a society, the confidence of the public as 
well as discourages international investments because investors know that they 
won’t see their projects being implemented.  
Clientelism and patrimonialism continue to lead the economic downfall of many 
aided developing countries because of the failure to complete projects or follow on 
policies. This has generally led to weak implementation of public administration 
projects, initiatives and other economic opportunities. Economic reforms in 
developing countries usually face an impossible situation because of certain 
administrative and technical capacity issues, but, more than that has been the 
influence of institutional and political factors (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002).  
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Some internationally-supported reforms often have their own measures on how to 
be implemented, thereby reducing rent seeking or patron-client relations. Such kind 
of donor-supported reform processes tend to be reversed or take too long to 
implement because politicians and their institutional counterparts want to keep the 
clientelistic relationships. Thus, patrimonialism is deeply embedded in institutional 
operations because even when government is committed to pursuing reform, they 
sometimes cannot resist the demands from the clientelistic relations. 
Patrimonialism and clientelism are often linked to ethnic class grouping, whereby 
people see themselves as sharing certain common features (historic, language, 
religion, culture, or other customs).  
Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2002) see this as an easy criterion in which to channel 
resources to certain areas and people. Ethnicity serves the client-patron very well 
because the patron is able build a followership by simply singling out people who 
share the same ethnic criteria. Therefore, the needy may be able to organise 
themselves into ethnic groupings in order to increase their chances and alliances 
with a certain prominent political figure (Chandra, 2001).  
2.1.12 Conclusion 
The main reason that patron-client relationships continue to thrive is because they 
play an essential role in providing for the poor, however it also breeds social 
exclusion for those with no contacts or affiliation. In order to prevent clientelism 
and patrimonialism, strategies should employ the concept of client-patron 
relationships as a foundation for organizing reforms. In order to have a more 
accountable and transparent governance system, strategies should mobilize 
domestic support. Evaluation and monitoring should always be ready to counter the 
results in case they become counterproductive to the quest of defeating clientelistic 
relations.  
While economic actors of clientelism rely on large state legal and regulatory 
reforms, if the government gets the prices right or end protectionist policies of 
trade, the trend of economic rent will disappear and monopolies reduced 
(Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). This way the state will be less exposed to the 
power elite bait because loosening trade regulations will open the market to 
economic market competition and such competition will demolish clientelistic 
connections. Clientelism and patrimonialism thrive when there are plenty of 
resources, when government is disorganised and when there’s public 
administration uncertainties. Many reform processes reduce but do not eliminate 
patronage networks.  
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Clientelism and patrimonialism are not good for governance, democracy or 
development because they enhance economic downfall and discourage 
investments. Therefore client-patron are both positive because while some see it as 
perpetuating poverty, some utilise their clientelistic relationships to counter 
poverty in their lives. In addition to the literature on clientelism addressing client-
patron relations and their associated resource allocation, recent research has 
focused on the impact of such clientelistic relationships on elections, public 
administration and democratic governance. The previous authors have analysed 
clientelism as an obstacle to effective government institutions, to citizenship and to 
consolidating a government democracy.  
However, one could neglect previous insights on clientelism, especially where the 
literature equates clientelistic practices to corruption in areas with less government 
control. Yet, it should be noted that client-patron relations differ from context to 
context and in some countries it is embedded in society while in others it is purely 
for rent-seeking than to reduce poverty. A clear shortcoming of clientelism 
literature has been the pure focus on local-national forms of patrimonialism, where 
by the connected roles of internal actors (officials) and external actors (politicians, 
chiefs, etc.) transform a society through resource allocation. It is, therefore, clear 
that the issue of how clientelism and patrimonialism far extends into even greater 
transnational structures has not been clearly addressed. That is still unclear given 
the international literature on clientelism in developing countries. 
2.2 Section B: Conceptual Framework 
2.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
According to Shields & Rangarjan (2013), conceptual frameworks are an 
organization of ideas that is used to achieve the purpose of a research project. A 
conceptual framework is used to analyse research data and arrange into easy ways 
to remember. They are abstract concepts that are connected to the research 
project work in order to direct data collection and data analysis. In this research 
report a working hypothesis will be utilised a method and type of conceptual 
framework because of the nature of the study. The study is exploring the 
implications and, as such, a working conceptual framework sets the lens with which 
to view and/or explore the implications as yet to occur. 
2.2.2 The basic elements of an institution 
As depicted by Ostrom (1999) and Chhotray and Stoker (2009), here the reader is 
asked to understand that institutions are a form of government and, as such, they 
will be shaped and developed by the actors in them – ‘rules-in-use’.  
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The reader should understand that governance is initially about the law, systems 
and procedures. The reader should also understand that the society is about values, 
principles, and the rule of law. In such society as one’s that strives to leap out of 
poverty, the priorities will be needs and service delivery. Therefore, the research 
will be framed by Chhotray and Stoker’s basic elements of governance in defining 
institutions. Firstly, institutions are about both the formal and informal rules that 
influence decision-making.  
Secondly, especially in democratic countries, institutions comprise of mutual control 
and influence because collective decision-making mechanisms. Thirdly, decision-
making in institutions should be both strategic and an everyday practice. Therefore, 
decisions will be based on procedures, by the collective, and actors will get used to 
the hierarchical systems in an institution. Lastly, the relationships and outcomes in 
governance cannot be formally controlled as the actors shape the institutions not 
the other way, especially not through formal rules and procedures. 
2.2.3 Models of Governance 
As depicted by Hammond & Knott (1996), there are four models of governance. The 
models are: Parliament or Congress as a key decision maker in government; 
President as a key decision maker and has dominant influence over the 
government; The courts and their legal power as controlling and influencing the 
government and; that government and/or governance is a joint control by all three 
including the society and that the government has a certain amount of autonomy 
from the three.  
In this research, the reader should understand that the fourth and last model is 
hereby utilised because of its applicability in the South African constitutional 
democracy. This is because South Africa has a constitution (including bill of rights) 
as the supreme law, has a president, a parliament, an independent judiciary, and a 
well-represented civil society and interest groups. The government has a certain 
level of autonomy from each of these except the constitution but governance is a 
joint control and responsibility. 
2.2.4 Governance in institutions 
The reader should understand that governance should be understood 
simultaneously with power because of the great political interest in the benefits 
that the society holds. This view is different from, and opposes Hix (1998), that 
governance is apolitical and that it should focus on non-hierarchical and 
deliberative multi-level systems.  
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Governance, as similar to institutions, is about the relation between actors and 
institutions, yet the relationship needs to be managed effectively. In order to better 
analyse research data collected, the reader should understand that people do not 
naturally respond to procedures and what occurs is that socio-political 
communication is power challenge to the society, a supply-and-demand cycle. 
Therefore, what seems as irrational is a natural response to the effects of social life 
and social relations. 
On governance in government, the reader should understand institutions and their 
associated public administration are created to serve the society. However, there 
are other actors than the political representatives and internal staff. In this view, 
governance should be understood relatively as an ever-evolving state mechanism 
that is facilitated by semi-autonomous actors who are society based and are linked 
to their own client-patron networks that are full of expectations. Good governance 
and service delivery, therefore, is a by-product of the continued relationship 
between the internal actors, the external actors, the political representatives and 
the clientelistic networks created. The research adapts to the views of UN ESCAP 
(2007) that there is no accountability without transparency and that good 
governance can never be fully achieved because of the deep rooted clientelistic 
networks that exists. 
2.2.5 Clientelism and Patrimonialism 
Above and beyond governance and institutional theory, the research is also framed 
by the concepts of clientelism and patrimonialism. The reader here should look at 
clientelism as a complex process that emerges from government programs that are 
entailed to aid the society. These are networks of aid between the supplier and 
those who use the services, because the client has needs and the patron provides. 
In poverty-stricken local governments, the national government is faced with issues 
of service delivery, poor financial management and corruption.  
These issues arise because of such clientelistic and patrimony relations. There are 
high political benefits for the elected political representatives of wards or sections 
of the society and, as such, client-patron relations prevail because the politicians 
keep on offering benefits to their own communities in return for political votes and 
constituency. It is human to aid one another, yet when it occurs within formal 
government structures it is unlawful. However, the client-patron networks continue 
to prevail because of the society’s expectations from their patrons as well as the 
continued need to maintain clientelistic networks. 
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2.2.6 Power, Autonomy and Interest 
While the research is also framed by concepts of power, autonomy, and interest, it 
is from the basis of governance and its associated client-patron networks that these 
develop. Clientelism breeds power relations of unequal power and status, it is also 
based interpersonal exchange (a high maintenance for patrons who carry too much 
expectations), and it is purely anchored by community norms and public law. 
Therefore, one is never fully autonomous because they fall within power 
hierarchies. All actors within institutions have power relationship over one another 
because of the rank in which they are placed and this is translated into the daily 
practice of decision-making and thus of social networks. The framework provides an 
analysis tool to which data collected will be analysed through. 
2.3 Section C: Concepts 
This section outlines the major concepts and the underlying theories that are 
central to the thesis in order to guide and frame the study. The concepts that the 
research analysed are autonomy, independence, transparency, power and interest. 
The theories that underpin the study, and engaging of the concepts above, are 
governance and institutional theories. These concepts and theory will be better 
detailed in the second chapter on literature review. 
2.3.1 Autonomy 
Autonomy is defined as “institutionalized separation (within the state)” (p.230, 
2005) by Weller and Wolff. In this way autonomy is measured through 
organizational and structural disconnection; as well as, through an effective 
assurance for maintaining the unity of states and institutions threatened by ethnic 
and political strife (Weller and Wolff, 2005). John Christman asserts the view that 
autonomy is only in relation to a particular context and states that “’relational 
autonomy’ is the label given, a conception of what it means to be free, self-
governing and defines one’s own basic value commitments in terms of 
interpersonal relations and mutual dependencies” (pg.2, 2004). According to 
Chirkov et al (2003), autonomy is when behaviour is experienced as willing enacted 
and when the actions engaged and the values expressed are fully endorsed.  
People, therefore, are autonomous when in tune with their integrated values and 
desires or authentic interests (Deci & Ryan, 1985). deCharms (1968) defined 
autonomy as origin of behaviour, because, when autonomous, one is firm behind 
one’s own decision and they feel the initiative. Autonomy is also seen as having a 
double meaning; one is the “issue of devolution or decentralization in the 
institutional fabric of a country”, while the other is comprised of “protection to 
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minority groups in society” through explicit means (Suksi, 1998, p.1) In light of the 
definitions above, autonomy in the study is defined as a state of self-governing 
wherewith the interaction and interrelation with other actors does not influence 
the value commitment that one has made.  
Autonomy relates to the next concept, independence, in that institutions such as 
the Tribunal ought to be independent in decision making as they greatly affect 
development as well as the communities within which they serve. 
2.3.2 Independence 
The notion of independence will be used in the study as relative to specific contexts. 
Independence is conventionally explained as freedom from the influence of control 
of others (Marchesani, 2005). If ‘dependence’ is the ‘reliance on others’ (Ryan & 
Lynch, 1989) then independence is the opposite. In this view, independence, as 
varying from the more inclusive autonomy, is a necessary condition for autonomy 
but not sufficient and shall be measured through external influence of other parties 
(person, people, organisation, etc.). Independence is hereby defined as the total 
lack of dependence on something or someone, a level of autonomy, and a general 
self-governance and self-influenced. The concepts of autonomy and independence 
falls in the debate about the role of politics in local government, because this 
debate reflects how patrimony and trifling autonomy may guide ultimate decisions 
(direct development or impact on performance as it relates to service delivery).  
While reflecting on Ghana as well, Natalini (2010) stated that ‘South Africa happens 
to be the only African country wherewith opposition parties have control over some 
of the local governments’. This reflects on how partisan politics affect local 
government institutions and the impact that those relationships might have on 
public participation and service delivery.  The government’s institutions, such as the 
Tribunal, are accountable to the public through service delivery and, as such, 
transparency is a pillar of good governance, a precondition that is necessary to 
benchmark and exercise accountability. 
2.3.3 Transparency 
Claudio Mesaros, in his book on Knowledge Communication: Transparency, 
Democracy, Global Governance (2011), posited that transparency is information 
oriented and as such, varied definitions persist. He defined it as a “clear 
convergence of information in the process of communication” and also stated that 
“if knowledge is power, then transparency provides power to all members of the 
society”. Through this, it must be understood that the concept of transparency has 
no dominant meaning and is applicable relative to information and communication. 
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Bianchi and Peters (2013) understood the dispersion of the meaning or definition of 
transparency when they stated that it influences values of participation and 
accountability. In this way, transparency is measured through the access to 
information and how that information influences action and participation in 
activities. In this study, transparency, as a broadly defined concept, is explained as 
the availing of information to all suitable people in a way that can foster 
participation and accountability through communication. 
2.3.4 Power and Interest 
2.3.4.1 Power 
Michel Foucault (1982) described power as a tool “which is exerted” and “gives the 
ability to modify, use, consume or destroy”. In this way, he saw power as being 
deeply embedded in aptitudes strictly related with the body or through external 
means. In Dennis Wrong’s Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (1979) Thomas Hobbes 
defines power as the “man’s present means to any apparent future good” (p.2). This 
definition of power sees power as being directive to achieve certain objectives as 
deemed necessary, good, or better by the one that exerts it.  
In a similar fashion, this depicts on how the public good of which the government’s 
institutions are ought to serve for might be swayed by interests of power-holding 
individuals, groups or organisations, leading to unjust ways. In the same Wrong’s 
book, power is defined by Bertrand Russell as the “production of intended effects” 
(1979, p.2). In this view, power is identified with mastery and potency because if 
effects are intended, those who exert power disregarded the autonomy, 
independence and interest of those whom they are exerting it to. However, 
Russell’s definition might be too general if one is to view power in terms of social 
relations. Power is strongly related to interest because when one is accountable to 
power measures they are serving the interest of those who exerted the power on 
them. 
2.3.4.2 Interest 
As it concerns a nation or a state, interest is defined an aggregation of goals and 
visions of the ruling entities, be it of financial prosperity and economic growth or 
equal services to all its citizens or of development to reach aspired targets as set out 
by the government (Trubowitz, 1998). Henri & Pudelko (2003), view interest as a 
shared passion of a view or an ideology where people participate in information 
sharing as it relates to their personal problems, in order to improve an 
understanding of the subject at hand. Interest, therefore, should be understood in 
terms of social sciences and not economics. Interest, in this study, is defined as a 
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shared ideology, one that orchestrates information sharing and participation in 
activities as being accountable to that shared ideology.  
‘Democratic local governance’ is a local government system where actors interact 
within the broader guidelines of the country’s political framework in order to 
manage the public matters of the communities they are accountable to (Olowu & 
Wunsch, 2004, p.1). In some contexts, such as that of Ghana and South Africa, when 
exploring local government autonomy dynamics, one is faced with the ‘overlapping 
identities’ in the interaction and interrelation between traditional leaders and local 
governments. As such government institutions are great instruments of research if 
one is to understand the concepts mentioned above. It is now possible to 
understand the study, the implementation and adoption of an institution (a 
government institution), as being also frame by institutional and governance 
theories. 
2.3.5 Institutional Theory 
In order to understand the organizational structure and behaviour of institutions 
such as the Tribunal the use of institutional theory proves to be of assistance (Dunn, 
2010). This is because institutional theory utilises a sociological perspective and 
draws attention from cultural, economic, political and social factors that influence 
organizational structures and their decision-making (Scott, 2001). It draws 
attention, in particular, to “how rationalized meanings or myths are adopted by 
organizations” (Dunn, 2010, p.5) and have been easily adapted to and followed in a 
rule-like fashion, especially when making decisions. Through institutional theory, 
one is able to unpack the implementation of adopting a government institution 
such as the Tribunal, against the backdrop of normalized political processes and 
legalised organizational structures.  
The approaches to be adopted by the Tribunal will be weighed against the 
politicised nature of local government and its institutionalized logic that governs the 
organizational behaviour and general decision-making. Institutional theory allows 
for an understanding of the SPLUMA Tribunal through its various explanations of 
institutions and their behaviour. Institutional theory posits that certain meanings 
and myths are rationalized and have led to the identification of social purposes as 
being technical and “specify in a rule like [sic] way the appropriate means to pursue 
these technical purposes” (Meyer and Rowan, 1997, pp.343-344). Therefore, 
through these processes, some professional criteria in service delivery are being 
legitimately mistaken for other personal, social, and even political responsibility. 
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Institutional theory also utilises information transparency (the level of honesty and 
efficiency at which information is shared among actors in an organisation), where 
with it measures accountability according to an organization’s accurate information 
sharing (Dunn, 2010). The theory also utilises the concept of professional networks, 
as it posits that not only will institutions that face similar issues adopt similar 
organizational structures but they will also adopt common measures and 
approaches as well (Dunn, 2010). Therefore, in government institutions, as Dunn 
(2010) further asserts, “isomorphism occurs as a result of coercive, mimetic, and 
normative pressures” (p.7). This suggests that professional networks are a 
representation of organizations with the same institutional logic. This allows for the 
use of approaches of governance theory as it relates to institutions. 
2.3.6 Governance Theory 
According to Stoker (1998), government refers to the “formal and institutional 
processes which operate at the level of the nation state to maintain public order 
and facilitate collective action” and is characterized by “its ability to make decisions 
and its capacity to enforce them” (p.1). Governance is “about the rules of collective 
decision-making in settings where there are a plurality of actors or organisations 
and where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship 
between these actors and organisations” (Chhotray & Stoker, 2010, p.3). Stoker 
(1998) offers five prepositions that can be utilised to understand governance and 
government as they pertain to public administration. 
He states that the set of actors and institutions (referred to as governance) are 
drawn from and beyond the government; that governance addresses the 
misconceptions of responsibilities for tackling economic and social issues; that 
governance identifies the power dependence among different institutions; that 
governance is about “autonomous self-governing network of actors”(p.2) and; that 
governance understands that service delivery does not depend on the 
government’s power command but the ability of the government to utilise new 
technique to steer action. Through this theory, the Tribunal will be seen as an 
institution that is draw from and also beyond the government and it will measured 
against the backdrop of creating institutions in governance theory. The theory will 
also be utilised to understand power and interest relationships between different 
organizations, structures and institutions such political parties, social groups of 
interest, community based structures and the government. 
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2.3.7 Integration of fields 
The concepts of autonomy, independence, transparency, power and interest are all 
in one way or another, integrated with the adoption and implementation of the 
Tribunal. As such, the Tribunal is an institution of government, allowing the use of 
both the institutional and governance to unpack and understand this important 
organizational structure. The fields detailed above are the various introductions and 
definitions of the concepts and theory that that is used in the study in order to 
better understand institutions – the Tribunal. 
2.4 Section D: The Conceptual Diagram 
Below is a diagram (Figure 1.1) that provides as a conceptual and diagrammatic 
representation of the main concepts of the research/study. It portrays the 
relationship in and between the concepts and how the relate to institutions as well 
as governance. The conceptual diagram further illustrates publicly perceived 
ideologies that develop from a civilian’s view (in the eyes of the general public 
and/or citizens of City of Johannesburg). These are the initial concepts that frame 
study and they differ to the conceptual framework. 
43 
 
 
44 
 
3 CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS (METHODOLOGY) 
3.1 Research Methods (Research Methodology) 
3.1.1 Qualitative Study 
 
Due to the nature of the study, exploratory, the research utilized the qualitative 
case study methodology. Qualitative methodology explores the Tribunals 
implications as they relate to the context of local government; it examines how 
innate experiences can be attributed to experiences and situations.  This method 
also utilises archived and documented information to learn of the existence or 
potential occurrence of discourse. The use of a case study signifies that the 
qualitative methodology will focus on a particular research site. The study utilized 
qualitative methodology because of its nature, exploring implications of a yet-to-be 
implemented legislature. Its purpose lies in being a closer read to the Act (16: 2013) 
to gain familiarity and acquire insight in order to formulate precise issues or 
develop hypotheses about the implications of the legislature (Kumar and Karoli, 
2011).  
 
This research took an interpretive approach, arguing that exploration is constructed 
through interaction with archives, documents and content that relate to the context 
(SPLUMA Tribunal as to be implemented at and affect the City of Johannesburg), 
and cannot be deconstructed independently of such. Therefore, it is impossible for 
an objective process of exploring the implications to exist independent of the 
various documents to be analysed. The author will explicitly avoid presupposing any 
theories regarding the Tribunal in advance and can only form theories and 
judgements from the data analysed (Hesse-Biber & Leavey, 2011), and this too is 
subject to the implementation of the Tribunal and its implications.  
 
However, the author acknowledges that his own subjectivity can affect implications 
and information derived from data (Creswell, 2009). As stated, the study is 
explorative, seeking to look at the implications of the Tribunal in detail. The primary 
focus is on what mechanisms are in place for the Tribunal as well how these 
mechanisms will ensure the realisation of the tasks envisioned for the SPLUMA 
Tribunal (rather than a why question) (Hesse-Biber & Leavey, 2011). The study did 
not seek to derive a singular unifying theory from the responses or the content 
analysed, as it is of exploratory nature, and the ideas or implications uncovered 
might unintentionally shape the implementations. 
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3.1.2 Case Study 
 
According to Baxter and Jack (2008: 544) “case studies afford researchers 
opportunities to explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of 
data sources. It allows the researcher to explore individuals or organizations, simple 
through complex interventions, relationships, communities, or programs”. It is 
against the backdrop of the City of Johannesburg’s municipal planning recent 
history together as it relates to planning legislations, that the case study was 
utilised to focus as well as attempt to understand the potential manifestation of the 
Tribunal institution and its implementations. The case study in this instance ensured 
that the implementation of the Tribunal was explored from various views and 
sources. 
3.1.2.1 Rationale for the Chosen Case study 
 
The rationale for choosing the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality as a 
suitable case study for the study/research is its recent history in relation to planning 
legislation, the 2010 Constitutional Court case between the City and an institution 
of its provincial counterpart, the Gauteng Development Tribunal (GDT). It is through 
the DFA (67: 1995) that land developments needed to be fast-tracked in order to 
close the gap on housing and development left by the apartheid regime, yet the 
decision to give such a provincial state apparatus as the GDT (chapter 3 of the DFA) 
the powers to do so were found unconstitutional and allowed for ‘forum shopping’. 
According to Jafta J (CoJ v GDT, 2010: 40) “… in granting applications for rezoning or 
the establishment of townships the development tribunals encroach on the 
functional area of “municipal planning””. 
 
Secondly, section 40 of the Constitution (1996) defines the government as 
consisting of three distinct, interdependent and interrelated spheres. Each sphere 
has the autonomy to carry out its duties within its jurisdictional parameters and 
must not assume any power or function than the one conferred to in/on it by the 
Constitution. Section 156 of the Constitution, when read together with Part B of 
Schedules 4 and 5, provide for legislative authority of municipal councils as well as 
functional areas of local government. It is these decisions from the court case that 
provide a relevant background to the case and a rationale of the City as best fit for 
exploration. While the Tribunal institution is to be set in all municipalities 
countrywide, it is worth noting that the City provides for a starting point to reflect 
upon. The City will provide for a better understanding into the Tribunal institution 
because of the 2010 court case and also because it had already a planning 
committee. 
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3.1.3 Library Study 
3.1.3.1 Historical Approach 
 
As a qualitative exploratory study, the research utilised a historical approach. The 
approach offered insight into organizational culture of the local government (the 
Tribunal foci), insight into past events, current occurrences, and prospective events. 
It is a method, a process of understanding and learning the background and 
discourse of a discipline, a profession or a filed. Through this process, the author is 
able to systematically examine an account of the occurrences prior to the 
implementation of the incumbent Tribunal together with that of the local 
government as it relates to the Tribunal. The study was an interpretation attempt to 
recapture, from the implications, the nuances, role players and issues that event. 
The study explored the implications through communicating past events as they 
relate to the Tribunal in question. As a scientific method, the historical approach 
was utilised to compare instances of politics in local government in order to reveal 
the general and the particular of those situations as they occurred prior to the 
implementation of the SPLUMA Tribunal. 
3.1.3.2 Content Analysis 
In adhering to the naturalistic paradigm, the study utilised content analysis as a 
qualitative research technique. It is regarded as a flexible method for analysing data 
(Cavanagh, 1997), but also that it is suitable for multiple analytical approaches to 
research study ranging from intuitive, impressionistic and interpretive analysis to 
those rigid text-only analysis (Rosengren, 1981). Content analysis, like document 
analysis, relies on the observation that ‘we learn about our discourse by 
investigating the material items that are produced within it’ (Hesse-Biber & Leavey, 
2011). For this specific study, the documents produced by varied government 
departments, state institutions on local government and public and private sector 
organisations affected by the SPLUMA Tribunal were included in data analysis.  
 
The type of content analysed included the draft SPLUMA regulations, material from 
various SPLUMA workshops by SACPLAN/SAPI (South African Council of 
Planners/South African Planning Institute) as well as articles written on SPLUMA 
(16: 2013). This is because these documents provided a good literature background 
on technical (SPLUMA Implementation Municipal Change Plan), social and economic 
(private sector and mining development applications) views. Any publicly available 
document on SPLUMA (16: 2013), the Tribunal and local government development 
planning was also considered as they strongly relate to the implementation of the 
SPLUMA (16: 2013) legislature.  
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However, while SPLUMA (16: 2013) is the main document, the DFA (67: 1995)’ 
chapter 5 and 6 are also significant. Content analysis, in this regard, is clearly 
important at looking at the implications of adopting the Tribunal creation in 
SPLUMA (16: 2013).  
 
Documents such as CoGTA’ (Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs) State of Local Government in South Africa; the National 
Treasury’ the State of Local Government Finances and Financial Management; the 
Constitutional Court Case (Case CCT 89/09 [2010] ZACC11) between CoJ and GDT 
and others; DRDLR (Department of Rural Development and Land Reform) SPLUMA 
Implementation and SPLUMA Draft Regulations (Notice 526 of 2014, Government 
Gazette) and; multiple SALGA (South African Local Government Association) 
comments on SPLUMA as well their own Learning Framework for Local Government 
are ideally crafted to represent the implications of the SPLUMA Tribunal in local 
government. These provided a more structured and carefully thought out 
perspective than the spontaneous responses obtained in an interview (Creswell, 
2009), without discrediting its significance. 
3.1.4 Interviews 
In their own words, the perspectives of different stakeholders or role players are 
best uncovered through an interview. The observatory technique of a case study 
will demonstrate the process but not the perspectives and opinions that underpin 
the reason of that process. The study encompassed members of a Tribunal, the 
Appeal Tribunal, the council they report to and the members of the Townships 
Board. The study involved a number of other key role players who would partake in 
the adoption and implementation of the SPLUMA MPT. The interviewed people 
include: the planning officials and administrators who will have been involved in the 
preparation to the creation of the incumbent SPLUMA Tribunal and its required 
changes. These people are important because of the nature of the Tribunal’s daily 
focus as being municipal planning.  
 
Secondly, the planning heads, these are the administrative heads of the entire 
municipality’s planning department and their significance is based on the 
institutional preparation (restructuring or re-engineering) in order to suit the 
SPLUMA requirements (increasing planning capacity) as well as in the monitoring 
and evaluation of the body in question. Lastly, the planning committee chairperson 
as the member of the municipal council, his significance was with the separation of 
powers between that of the Tribunal, the municipality’s vision and the political 
mandates not/impeding with the autonomy and independence of the body and 
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thus the direction of development. The municipal council is tasked with being an 
Appeal Tribunal and as such a potential member of that council could be a planning 
head or development planning director. 
 
The interviews conducted were semi-structured because the focus was on the 
creation, adoption and implementation of the Tribunal amidst local government 
challenges, and did not seek to explore other topics based upon interviewee 
responses (because that possibility exists with unstructured interviews). However, 
as a qualitative exploratory quest, the interview was not completely structured as 
the author acknowledged that respondents may have relevant knowledge and 
information pertaining to the topic that the author did not consider in advance 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavey, 2011). For the questionnaire, a list of objective-based sub 
topics relating to the creation of the Tribunal in SPLUMA was prepared, with 
general questions under each so as to guide the interview. However, the qualitative 
nature of the study allows for some flexibility to explore further implications as they 
relate to the topic (Hesse-Biber & Leavey, 2011). The interview guides were not 
uniform for each interview as the study was exploring the implications in various 
ways. Therefore, question subtopics or guidelines were slightly tailored to the 
differing roles of the stakeholders. 
3.1.4.1 Sampling: Snowballing 
The study utilised a selection method or technique known as snowball sampling. It 
is a referral system defined as a technique for gathering study or research 
interviewees or subjects through identifying an initial subject of who is used to 
provide the names of others (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). These subjects may open 
channels for an expanding web of contacts and inquiry. It was used in the study due 
to the difficulty in recruiting the identified potential respondents and thus will aid in 
data collection. The objective, through this purposive and expedient strategy, was 
to find one qualifying subject and seek recommendations to several others whom 
are of value to the study objectives. This is a type of a random sample and although 
the author has detailed out the potential respondents ideally suited for the study, it 
does not rule out potential stakeholders who have not been considered in advance. 
3.2 Literature Framework: Analysis method 
3.2.1 Constant comparative analysis 
The study utilised constant comparative analysis as a framework tool for analysing 
and making sense of data. While this method is developed from the sociological 
theory of symbolic interactionism (Thorne, 2000), its use for comparing the setting 
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up of the Tribunal to multiple other (government) institutions nationally and 
elsewhere is immense. Symbolic interactionism utilises previous stories, cases and 
events and uses them to compare to other similar stories in such a way as if they 
were interacting with each other. It uses the term interactionism to mean ways in 
which cases can and may be familiar to each other as if trying to copy one another 
in an interactive way. This method allows for conceptualisation about any 
similarities from data collected with those of similar experience from other 
institutions and thus should provide a way to benchmark the Tribunal’s implications 
of resources, capacity, autonomy, independence, power and interest, monitoring 
and evaluation.  
 
Through viewing already-existing institutions, the study was able to draw pathways 
to understanding how institutions are setup and the different facets that enable 
them to be independent, autonomous, relevant, trustworthy, resourceful, 
capacitated among many other traits that shape institutions. It is through this 
method of analysis that the study was able to delineate differences and similarities 
in institutions and tries to link and understand the variations together with their 
meanings for the Tribunal. Scott, Richard and Meyer (1994) define institutions as 
“symbolic and behavioural systems containing representational, constitutional and 
normative rules together with regulatory mechanisms that define a common 
meaning system and give rise to distinctive actors and action routines. Meyer et al 
(1977) define them as “social processes, obligations or actualities that come to take 
on a rule-like status in social thought or action”. The Tribunal is a type of institution, 
a form of a government structure governed by the Constitution and multiple other 
legislations pertaining institutions. 
3.2.2 Phenomenological Approaches 
While the comparative nature of a study might have brought out patterns and 
commonalities, it was also crucial to understand individual case experience 
especially since the meaning and use of a Tribunal may prove different to other 
committee and town planning board elsewhere. The use of this was limited as the 
Tribunal was not yet implemented. The validity of this method comes with the 
experience of multiple other South African state institutions that were implemented 
and have the same issues as those implicated by the incumbent SPLUMA (16: 2013) 
Tribunal (Municipal Planning Tribunal). The method also allowed for bracketing or 
setting aside of such preconceptions as would be gathered from comparative cases 
and work inductively to come up with new formulations (Thorne, 2000). 
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4 CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY INTRODUCTION – City of Johannesburg 
4.1 The South African Local Government 
“The History: Prior to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 
1996 and preceding the transition to democratic local government, local 
authorities, as they were then known, were mere creatures of statute 
created by provincial governments. Although the different provincial 
ordinances led to a variety of procedures, structures and processes, the 
municipalities, established in terms of the ordinances had a common 
feature. Because of their lack of constitutional status, they were creatures of 
statute, and possessed only such rights and powers as was specifically or 
impliedly granted to them by the legislature. It rendered all their actions, 
including the passing of by-laws, administrative actions, subject to judicial 
review. Municipalities, it can be said, thus existed at the mercy of the 
provinces. 
The Transformation process: In 1990, the transformation of local 
government was directed at removing the racial basis of government and 
making it a vehicle for the integration of society and the redistribution of 
municipal services from the well-off to the poor. Local government in South 
Africa entered a new era with the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. The 
Constitution introduced, for the first time in our history, a wall-to-wall local 
government system by providing that municipalities ‘be established for the 
whole of the territory of the Republic’.” (South African Local Government 
Association, 2011[online] Available at: 
http://www.salga.org.za/pages/Municipalities/About-Municipalities ). 
 
 
4.2 A peak into the Chapter 
This chapter provides an introduction and rationale to the chosen case study of the 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality in Johannesburg. It does so by first 
providing a background into the dynamic history and timeline of Johannesburg over 
the years. It then provides the history and development of the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality from over the years as well. The Chapter goes further to 
outline the planning committees and how they operated in recent years up until the 
2010 Gauteng Development Tribunal v City of Johannesburg Constitutional Court 
case. Lastly, the chapter provides context into the preparations made by SPLUMA 
Implementation Committees to enable municipal readiness for the new planning 
legislature. 
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4.3 Johannesburg: The City of Johannesburg 
“WE ARE A WORLD CLASS AFRICAN CITY: A city that treats our citizens as 
partners and co-producers of services, empowering them to be part of the 
solution; a city that has triumphed over complexity to build strong 
institutions; a city that joins forces with its citizens to enable better choices 
on how they live; a city that takes its place on the great stages of the world, 
amplifying the voices of urban Africa; a city, founded by newcomers, 
sustained by diversity, reaffirming that it will always be open to the 
continent and the world” – Executive Mayor, Cllr Parks Tau (City of 
Johannesburg’ State of the City Address 2015, pp.21-22). 
Located in southern part of the Gauteng province in South Africa, Jo’burg or Jozi (as 
the city of Johannesburg is commonly known as) finds itself as a vibrant, rapidly 
changing hub of various opportunities. Its local government, the municipality, is also 
no different. The Local Government Handbook (2015) has described the 
City/CoJ/CJMM (City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality) as the engine 
room to Africa’s advanced commercial city and Southern African regional economy. 
With aliases such as ‘city of gold’ to the ‘urban jungle’, the city thrives by the 
multitudes of people it attracts that come looking for ‘better’ lives. It disguises as a 
supplier of quality of life, education, housing, health and other economic 
opportunities. It appeals to both the poor and wealthy, the refugees and residents, 
the global and local, the learned and the unlearned, young and old and many others 
from far other where places. It prides itself in being an ethnically large and diverse 
city. 
It is a growing city with a rich historic layer. For such an ideal urban place that is in 
close proximity to economic opportunities, land and transport, the CoJ Municipality 
has to frequently administer issues over forced removals, illegal settlements, 
squatter camps, corruption, basic services among others. It is against this 
background that the City continues to work toward better development, equipping 
its citizens with all the right tools for better livelihoods. It continues to launch 
various projects as interventions to poverty, unemployment, urban management, 
literacy, and crime and safety issues. In doing so, all state (municipal) institutions 
provide a crucial role toward the City’s accountability to its citizens, a role which 
need only be transparent and just to all. As more and more people need land either 
to live in, farm, develop and redevelop, the City is the key role player in ensuring 
the needs and rights of all people are met in a just and procedural manner. In order 
to better process its town planning or land development applications, the City relied 
on various planning legislation in conjunction with the Constitution (1996) as 
apparatus to grant and manage land use rights to all applicants.  
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In doing so, it has set aside a committee, which further arranges for land 
development applications criterion, in order to dispose of such applications. Such a 
committee is a vital organ of the City as an institution that serves the public 
interest. The setup, location and relationship of such a committee with other state 
institutions and public and private organisations then becomes an important 
cornerstone for transparency, justice, and accountability 
 
Below is a diagram depicting the City of Johannesburg’s administrative boundaries. 
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4.4 Johannesburg: The Founding 
The area of Johannesburg was initially founded as a proclaimed mining area of eight 
farms and its land was owned by the then Government of Transvaal. The origin of 
the name Johannesburg as a name of the area remains a mystery yet many still 
believe it was named after two officials, namely Messers Christiaan Johannes 
Joubert and Johann Rissik (Beavon, 2004). Its growth and formation is owed more 
to the struggles of the miners who worked in the mining camps set out in 
Johannesburg. The area developed as an urban geography, a diversified footprint of 
people from all over the country seeking work opportunities and a nearby place of 
residence. However, its early fortunes arose significantly between 1886 and 1899 
when knowledge and confidence about geology and mining reached many 
investors’ ears. 
As mining activities grew, many proclaimed land in the Johannesburg area with 
varying sizes of registered companies intending to make fortunes out the gold that 
is lying underneath. Much of the small companies had gained experience and 
confidence from other mining activities elsewhere (Kimberley) and had 
consolidated into a single large company that was funded by banks. It is during the 
1880s that much of the actual mining activities on the ground would be stagnant 
due to lack of mining tools and equipment as companies had to wait for off shore 
countries such as England (London) to supply them with material. Yet, 
Johannesburg as area of opportunity, kept of growing and expanding with 
multitudes coming in looking for opportunities. By 1894, the area of Johannesburg 
had expanded and included a central business district. While the following years 
would represent the economic slump of gold trading and infiltration of the British 
nationals, the area of Johannesburg remained (Beavon, 2004). 
From the 1890s onward, the area was on the process of rejuvenation and mining 
companies dependent on constant production of gold in order to continue 
operating. Johannesburg, from that point, improved greatly in infrastructure as 
mining developments coupled together with almost 40 000 miners and their 
families required more than carts to traverse the mining Johannesburg area 
(Beavon, 2004). This saw the introduction of light railway that linked the coal area 
Boksburg, which successfully transported coal and passengers to and out of the 
mines and the Johannesburg area at large. 
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4.5 Johannesburg Local Management: From a Digger’s Committee to a Quasi-
Municipality 
In 1897, the Kruger government declared Johannesburg to be a formal municipality, 
a town, and a city with many separate townships beside it (Beavon, 2004). The 
separate townships did not contribute or withdraw from Johannesburg’s economic 
pockets because they were not recognised and did not form a part of Johannesburg. 
This meant that townships survived on their own attraction base. The area was 
initially controlled and administered by a mining commissioner, then changed to a 
nine-member committee of diggers and later by an expanded diggers committee 
that included non-digging members. While these various committees did not mean 
that Johannesburg was formally considered, as it was considered a mining camp, 
their sole purpose was public health and by the 1890s they could not aid and 
control what was then the largest town. 
A sanitary board was elected and it was later followed by a limited municipal 
government, and this only after the Jameson Raid fiasco in 1895 (Beavon, 2004). It 
was only after the 1900s, once the British occupied Johannesburg, that a full 
municipal government had been establishment. Between 1900 and 1906, the new 
Milner administration was ushered in, as the British conquerors handed over the 
government to the whites and Transvaalers (people of the Transvaal land) and not 
the non-white community. A plethora of racial laws was to follow, and this 
subsequently meant the creation of a segregated Johannesburg. Following the 
Union of South Africa’s independence from the British colonisers, a white minority 
governed and asserted its dominance over the entire Johannesburg land. Having 
established the history of the City of Johannesburg both as an area with its local 
governing structures, it is now possible to follow logic and give a contemporary 
development of the institution up to the current arrangement. 
4.6 Uniting a divided Johannesburg: from separate townships and separate 
substructures to transitional and formalised statuses 
Fast forward to the 1990s, there’s a realisation that the current status of local 
government is not much different to the old ones as described above, mainly 
because municipalities still raise greater proportions of their own revenue. After the 
1994 political transitions in South Africa, there was a need to restructure a plethora 
of old order systems and that included the reorganisation of government structures 
and institutions. The post-apartheid administrators focused more on the 
redistribution of rights across the entire Johannesburg landscape, and this meant 
the inclusion of the formerly excluded townships around the mining town (Beall, 
Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). 
56 
 
Before 1994, there had existed 13 demarcated local government institutions that 
were racially categorized. These institutions operated under different planning 
legislations and service delivery levels. Between 1991 and 1995, there were 2 
notable Johannesburg structures. The first was the Central Witwatersrand 
Metropolitan Chamber (CWMC), which was formed after the 1990 Soweto Accord 
(Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002) and was meant to resolve service delivery and 
unite the metropolitan Johannesburg. Secondly, there was the Greater 
Johannesburg Local Negotiation Forum and this was the same CWMC acting as a 
decision making forum under the transitional Local Government Act in 1993. This 
forum proposed to have a single metropolitan government with certain sub-
structures. 
Between 1995 and 1997, greater powers were assigned to metropolitan local 
government structures and Johannesburg was a metropolitan with four local 
councils. However, the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council experience 
difficulties in the redistribution and management of the entire newly created 
systems and there was a need for re-institutionalization. As of 2001, legislature on 
local adopted dominant metropolitan council and local government elections were 
to follow suit (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). The City of Johannesburg is now 
a unified large dominant metropolitan municipality and it is no new idea that the 
planning and development of urban areas is the purview of local government 
institutions.  
Therefore, the decentralisation that has occurred in South Africa since 1994 has 
meant that areas such as Johannesburg would undergo a phase of integration, 
absorption of previously excluded townships and communities into one unified 
metropolitan city government (Beall, Crankshaw & Parnell, 2002). As of 2015, the  
Johannesburg local council or metropolitan government is made of seven (7) 
regions (see Fig 1.2) and is commonly known as City of Johannesburg (CoJ) or the 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CJMM).  
The regions are as follows: Region A, which includes former old regions 1 and 2, 
includes areas such as Diepsloot, Fourways, Sunninghill and Woodmead; Region B, 
with old regions like 3 and 4, includes such areas Rosebank, Bryanston and 
Randburg; Region C is the old region 5 and includes areas such as Bram Fischerville, 
Thulani and Florida; Region D, the biggest region, is a consolidation of former 
regions 6 and 10 and is comprised of Soweto only; Region E is the former region 7 
and includes such areas as Parkwood, Alexandra and Morning side; Region F, which 
incorporates former regions 8 and 9, has areas as Glenvista, Ormonde and 
Kensington in its boundaries and; there is Region, which is the former region 11, 
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and it includes areas such as Lenasia, Eldorado Park and Protea (www.joburg.org.za, 
2015). 
CJMM has allocated its duties into multiple departments. It has such planning and 
urban development responsibilities being allocated to such City directories as 
Development Planning and Urban Management, Development Management, Land 
Use Management, Development Planning and Facilitation among others. Moreover, 
and of greater significance to the research report, the City’s development planning 
applications are handled by a planning committee. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: SPLUMA AND THE MUNICIPAL PLANNING TRIBUNAL 
5.1 LOCAL PRECEDENCE: From Gauteng Development Tribunal & Planning 
Committee to Municipal Planning Tribunal  
The research report purpose was to explore the implications of the SPLUMA 
Municipal Planning Tribunal. There have been tribunals in South Africa before, 
however, in the context of SPLUMA no institution gives good precedence and a 
direct link to the SPLUMA (16: 2013) legislated tribunal like the Gauteng 
Development Tribunal (GDT). This was because the Gauteng Development 
Tribunal’s downfall led to the enactment of the SPLUMA Municipal Planning 
Tribunal (City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development 
Tribunal & others (CCT89/09) [2010] ZACC 11; 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC); 2010 (9) BCLR 
859 (CC) (18 June 2010)). As precedence to the SPLUMA Municipal Planning 
Tribunal, the 2010 Constitutional court case presented findings that were useful in 
understanding the operation of a planning tribunal, the use of power, authority and 
interest as well as politicisation in government institutions. The following is an 
analysis of the 2010 court case and the initial findings that were useful in order to 
explore the implications of a SPLUMA Municipal Planning Tribunal. 
Background: 
The City of Johannesburg is authorised by Section 2 of the Town-planning and 
Townships Ordinance (15: 1986) to determine applications on the establishment of 
townships and rezoning of land within its area of jurisdiction. From 1997, the 
Tribunal (Gauteng Development Tribunal) began to determine land development 
(rezoning and township establishment) applications. The Gauteng Development 
Tribunal decided on such applications within the City of Johannesburg’s area of 
control (by jurisdiction). In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(1996), the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality is entitled to dispose of 
rezoning and township establishment applications within its area of jurisdiction. It is 
worth noting that the Constitution of South Africa is the supreme law and, as such, 
there were issues with the DFA-legislated Gauteng Development Tribunal. 
Issues;  
The main focus of this research report was on how a tribunal works and might work 
at the local level of government. As provided with the evidence gathered from 
interviews, the operations of a tribunal at the local level government will can be 
understood by understanding the Planning Committee of a municipality. 
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As such, it was crucial to look at the current operations of a Planning Committee. 
However, while the DFA-led Tribunal was not the main focus, it is important to note 
that it has led to the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal. Therefore, the DFA (67: 1995) and 
its Tribunal have provided precedence to the operations of a Tribunal. 
One of the main issues was the constitutionality of chapters 5 and 6 of the 
Development Facilitation Act (67: 1995). This is because the chapters give authority 
to provincial development tribunals, such as the Gauteng Development Tribunal, 
that were established by the very Act to decide on township establishment and 
rezoning applications. The same authority was given to local government within its 
area of jurisdiction by a different set of legislature (The Constitution and the 
Ordinance). 
The Gauteng Development Tribunal decided on land development applications in a 
manner that undermined the City of Johannesburg’s development planning 
principles and the Planning Committee because it did not take into account the 
City’s development planning criteria and also allowed for forum shopping (a 
practice adopted by people who are involved in lawsuits to have their legal cases 
heard in courts that are thought likely provide a favourable judgment). This forum 
shopping practice was used by applicants who had connections with members of 
the DFA-led Tribunal. The applicants would apply to the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality for a development but get rejected or disapproval for 
such a development.  
Many an applicant would then forward their applications to the DFA-led Tribunal 
and get it approved there. Because of such connections they had with members of 
the DFA-led Tribunal and also because the DFA (67: 1995) was concerned with 
expediting development, applications would get many of their development 
applications approved. For those who couldn’t get their developments, they utilised 
whatever means to ensure their Tribunal meetings were held and hosted by a panel 
that would most likely yield positive results. This was the norm and practice of 
forum shopping. 
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The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality’s Planning Committee is a local 
government structure while the Gauteng Development Tribunal was an organ 
created under the provincial level of government. On the one hand, municipalities, 
as the local level of government was known, are provided for by the Ordinances (for 
Johannesburg, it is the Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance no.15 of 1986) to 
create planning instruments such a town-planning schemes that will determine how 
the land within such municipal area will be utilised or zoned. Therefore, this meant 
that there are authorised officials in the employ of the municipalities that consider 
and determine development planning applications.  
 
On the other hand, chapters 5 and 6 of the Development Facilitation Act (67: 1995) 
authorised the provincial development tribunals to undertake the same duties as 
the authorised local government authorities within the local government area of 
jurisdiction. This was supposedly done in good faith to speed up development 
within South Africa. However, the 2010 court decision played in the favour of local 
government, with Judge Jafta J (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2010) stating 
that Schedule 4B and 5B read together with section 156 of the Constitution have 
authorised municipalities to undertake ‘municipal planning’ (of which includes 
rezoning and township establishment) duties within their own area of jurisdiction. 
 
When it was confirmed that chapters 5 and 6 of the DFA (67: 1995) are 
unconstitutional, it also meant that the enactment of a single comprehensive spatial 
planning and land use management legislation would have to be implemented in 
order to remedy the defects of that decision. This remedy came in the form of 
SPLUMA legislation (16: 2013), of which through it, the local government-based 
Municipal Planning Tribunals were introduced. Therefore, what is significant in the 
2010 court case is the operation of a planning tribunal and its effect on 
development. The Gauteng development Tribunal gave a good precedence on the 
contemporary tribunal operations. 
5.2 The DFA-led Gauteng Development Tribunal  
Since its inception in 1995, the DFA (67: 1995) was used as a tool for large private 
developments and as such it attracted attention of developers. Therefore, with 
many small municipalities experiencing capacity and resource backlog coupled with 
the application of various old order planning legislations, the DFA (67: 1995) created 
less complex ways to approve developments and therefore the Tribunals under the 
act had an ever increasing number of large investment development applications 
(Urban Landmark, 2010). 
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Within the City of Johannesburg, the DFA-led GDT was responsible for large-scale 
developments while the in-municipality Planning Committee would deal with low-
income housing developments among others, mostly in terms of the Ordinance 
(15:1986) or the Less Formal Townships Establishment Act no. 113 of 1991 
(LEFTEA).  
The main issue with this was the developments approved in accordance with the 
DFA were encouraging of residential urban sprawl on the city outskirts and they had 
little concern for infrastructure carrying capacity or the related services that go 
along with that (Urban Landmark, 2010). What remains was that many 
municipalities still used LEFTEA (113:1991) and many of the DFA-dealt applications 
were recorded as unknowns because of the backlog and confusion around the DFA 
(67: 1995) as well the wait on the repeal of provincial legislature.  The GDT was seen 
as an unjust institution to the general public because of the multitudes of private 
developments that were approved disregarding the needs of the low income 
population in those areas. Many complaints were the GDT did not consider local 
economic development applications that would have uplifted poor communities but 
instead promoted private developments that would include gated communities, 
industries and other developments that were of either harm or no financial help to 
the nearby locals. 
In not following the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality’s development 
planning criteria, the GDT did not take into consideration such tools as the town 
planning schemes (which determines the general land use of an area and its 
compatible uses), urban development boundaries or development zones. It was to 
the municipality’s knowledge that the GDT’s procedures in approving applications 
might have been unknown but they allowed favouritism and political and financial 
influence (corrupt practices) in doing so. This was because forum shopping was only 
one of the few issues that the municipality could prove as fact whereas the 
corruption concerns or political influence that favoured some applications over 
others could not be tangibly proven.  
The City of Johannesburg, however, stated in the court case that many of the 
applications that were declined by their own Planning Committee were approved by 
the GDT, and this was despite the fact that those applications were not in 
accordance with any legislation and did not have sufficient town planning merits 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2010). 
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5.2.1 Issues with DFA-led Tribunals 
One of the issues as set out in the 2010 court case was that the GDT never followed 
the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality’s planning instruments and 
criteria.  
The eThekwini Municipality experienced the same issue as well, wherewith it felt 
that the provincial tribunals encroached on their mandated (local government) 
functions (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1996). This shows that the power or 
authority that had been given to the provincial tribunals by the DFA (67: 1995) 
allowed these tribunals to act in any manner that is determined by the tribunal 
itself without consulting the local government structures. 
Other parties in the court case included the property sector council (SAPOA) as well 
as the council of consulting planners; these parties aligned their interests with the 
GDT because the DFA (67: 1995) had the interests of the private sector (or large-
scale private developments) at heart through its procedures and allowed for an 
expedient process of development. As stated, some of the practices and decisions 
by the GDT allowed forum shopping, a preferential court treatment or practice of 
sort and this is a form of clientelistic relationship in a way because of the bonds 
shared in between such a tribunal organisation and the applicants.  
If clientelism is a practice between a client and patron wherewith they share 
resources in exchange for benefits then the DFA-led Tribunal was the patron and 
the development applications were the clients. The client would apply for a 
development and ensure to have a favourable hearing with a certain set members 
of the DFA-led Tribunal. The patron, being the Tribunal in this instance, would 
ensure such a favourable decision is made by approving of developments even 
when they might have been rejected at the local level of government. This could 
have also been in exchange of monetary gains. This could also been the result of 
expediting development as a procedure and mandate of the DFA (67: 1995). 
This was because some of the applications that would normally be disapproved 
would be appealed in a different appeal tribunal and seek a suitable court that 
would judge in their favour. It is such practices that were envisaged to be removed 
through the SPLUMA Municipal Planning Tribunal. Also, because the DFA-led GDT 
was a provincial organ that undertook local government functions without any 
agreement with the local government, it meant that a certain level of clarity was 
required around functions, authority as well as the relationship between the 
different levels of government. It is through SPLUMA that intergovernmental 
relations as well as functions of local government are better explained as to what 
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the Municipal Planning Tribunal, and Appeal Tribunal, would be responsible for and 
what ‘municipal planning’ means. The DFA (67: 1995) did not clarify the varying 
functions and legislative or authoritative powers with other government levels 
because it was merely focused on addressing the lack of development. 
The provincial departments that took part in the 2010 court case, making common 
cause with the tribunal, argued that municipalities were stifling development with 
their delayed responses to development planning applications and that the 
tribunals have approved development applications that guarantee economic 
growth. The tribunals were seen as providing an efficient and effective process of 
development planning applications yet the power given to the tribunals allowed 
unfair administrative practices and an increased level of corruption between such 
officials and private developers (Urban Landmark, 2010).  However, the tribunals 
were seen as instruments used by private developers to escape planning 
procedures and have their own developments approved (Urban Landmark, 2010), 
thereby promoting unjust practices in planning. While looking at the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the GDT, it was important to note in provinces such as Mpumalanga 
and Limpopo the DFA (67: 1995) was the only land use legislation that applied in the 
entire provincial boundaries and as such no other tribunal or planning committee.  
In such provinces like Mpumalanga and Limpopo the Ordinance (15: 1986) left gaps 
because it did not cover the entire provincial landscape but was only limited to 
older areas. The DFA-led provincial Tribunals were the only option for development. 
Therefore, a natural relationship between the developers and the tribunal would 
occur. It is because of such expediency that the DFA (67: 1995) legislature brought 
to development that the Mpumalanga planning departments had an ever increasing 
number of development applications, only proving further that the DFA (67: 1995) 
favoured the developers of large-scale private developments than anyone else 
(Urban Landmark, 2010). Post the declaration of the chapters 5 and 6 of the DFA 
(67: 1995) to be unconstitutional, issues emerged on and about the proposed 
SPLUMA tribunal that is to be implemented.  
SPLUMA (16: 2013), as a remedial situation for DFA (67: 1995) and many other old 
order town planning legislation, proposed a municipal tribunal. However, the 
municipal planning tribunal (Tribunal or MPT) was to be based within the municipal 
boundaries, be comprised of officials in the employ of the municipality and its 
subsequent appeal tribunal (Appeal Tribunal) will be comprised of the municipality’s 
council members. This raised issues that have long been insinuated, such that if so 
much is being said about the local government being corrupt, the locational factors 
of the tribunal raised doubts over the transparency of government institutions.  
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Clientelistic relationships build up and go on for long periods of time. Therefore, if 
such a tribunal was to be comprised of municipal officials the municipality as an 
entity or a structure of government it will not be seen as representing the public 
interest because of the belief that it will operate in a corrupt way. The National 
Treasury Report (2013) stated political intervention and the lack of transparency as 
issues that promote corruption and the lack of proper governance. The reason 
being that the DFA-led GDT allowed for large-scale private developments in order to 
promote economic development and hopefully alleviate poverty but all it did was 
deviate from the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality’s planning 
policies, thereby ignoring the public interest that the City had planned for. Secondly, 
the municipal-based tribunal has put into effect its local government town planning 
mandates. However, the general public or civilians as well as the private sector 
negatively were not affected because of the correlation between the internal town 
planning and the tribunal’s relationship. 
SPLUMA (16: 2013) for the private sector, which so much depended on the 
expediency of the DFA (67:1995), meant that the private sector will see much of 
their client-patron bonds with the provincial tribunal broken and developments 
delayed or disapproved .  
The general public on the other hand will want to see justice, to see the Tribunal as 
an organ of the local government in the public interest but not corrupt or 
malfunctioning. The line between clientelism and corruption is very thin and one 
does not know the difference between helping and stealing. It is against the law to 
aid with government property or possessions and one should aid from their own 
coffers yet what transpires in client-patron relations is that government officials 
would sway developments to specific areas for political gain because of pressure of 
being fired or replaced be political forces. It is such practices from clientelistic 
relationships that result in institutional malfunction, corruption, and 
maladministration (Mr Nkosi, 2015). 
Also, the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality is perhaps an exception 
here, but the implementation of the SPLUMA MPT requires institutional 
restructuring for many local governments, some of which did not undertake their 
own town planning matters. However, what the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality is not exempt from is that there is more than procedure or the law 
required to provide justice, to maintain service delivery and public interest and be 
efficient and effective with its own Tribunal. The City of Johannesburg has already 
been addressing and dealing with development planning applications through a 
Planning Committee and its transition to a Tribunal should not be problematic as 
such.  
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In order to explore and understand how the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality’s SPLUMA Tribunal, it was important understand the nature and 
operation of the CJMM Planning Committee. 
5.3 The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality’s Planning Committee 
After attending the City of Johannesburg’s Planning Committee hearings with Kobus 
Van Wyk (Office of Executive Mayor, Senior Legal Advisor & Member-Chair of the 
Planning Committee) and Vusi Nkosi (Department of Development Planning, 
Transformation and Environment & Planning Committee Services Officer), it WAS 
understood that the Planning Committee has long existed and has been dealing 
with the development applications for the City of Johannesburg as per various town 
planning legislature, such as the Ordinance (15: 1986), but not the DFA (67: 1995). 
However, the city has adapted to the new SPLUMA (16: 2013) regulations and, as 
such, has now begun implementing a Municipal Planning Tribunal and the Planning 
Committee is reflective of those new adaptations.  
Mr Van Wyk (2015) is one of the legal attorneys that represent the municipality that 
have been chosen to sit on and chair the Municipal Planning Tribunal. As the 
chairperson, he has filed a report to the Executive Mayor detailing the transition of 
the municipality’s Planning Committee to a Municipal Planning Tribunal. At the time 
of the interview, Mr Van Wyk was yet to submit such a report but talked about the 
temporary arrangements toward the transition and the contents of such a report. 
The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CJMM) Municipal Planning 
Tribunal comprises of 5 members of whom are chosen from a pool of 30 officials in 
the employ of the municipality.  
According to Chapter 6 Section 36 (a) (b) of SPLUMA (16: 2013), a Municipal 
Planning Tribunal must be comprised of full-time municipal officials and; non-
officials that have experience and knowledge of land development, spatial planning 
and land use management. The CJMM’s MPT consists of officials only and does not 
have any external actor appointed to it. When asked about this, Mr Vusi Nkosi 
(2015) stated that there was a great lack of external persons that are 
knowledgeable and experienced about the requirements of the MPT that have 
shown interest. He stated several factors that led to the CJMM MPT being an all-
officials only structure. If previous municipal officials with such prerequisite 
knowledge were to be appointed, it would be procedurally unjust and be biased 
against the municipality’s clients. This was because such previous employees now 
have companies and are practising as private town planners.  
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Another reason was also because the municipality believes that the re-employment 
such ex-employees would cost them dearly and it is no different to utilising the 
current internal members of staff in the meantime. The CJMM has also considered 
external town planning associations such as SAPI or experienced actors such as 
planning professionals but Mr Nkosi (2015) stated that they would consider 
appointing those persons if they show interest. Another factor is that SPLUMA (16: 
2013) and its regulations are fairly recent and that they would slowly implement all 
other requirements timeously.  
The CJMM has, however, followed all protocol in appointing its 5-member panels to 
sit of the MPT (Van Wyk, 2015). This is because every panel chosen to sit as a MPT 
in the municipality has at least 3 people that form a quorum in order to make 
decisions and also that all members of that panel will be specialists that have 
experience and knowledge of the SPLUMA (16: 2013) requirements. Moreover, the 
CJMM was, or is until such a report from the Planning Committee is sent to the 
municipality’s Executive Mayor, operating with rotating committee/tribunal chosen 
from a pool of 30 senior officials in order to better facilitate and administer the 
development planning applications of the municipality. This was because with their 
Planning Committee the municipality has always had an ever increasing number of 
applications of which often include 10 items per week inclusive of site inspections 
and committee hearings. This has led to having multiple committees/tribunals per 
week. 
In the wake of SPLUMA (16: 2013), the CJMM was planning to increase the current 
pool of 30 officials to 50 senior officials as there is pressing need for such capacity 
(Van Wyk, 2015). This was largely because the work of the Planning Committee (or 
the now Municipal Planning Tribunal) also takes the officials delegated away from 
their day-to-day duties. Therefore, the CJMM MPT that sits will hopefully be able to 
deal with the planning applications without having to lag behind with their 
responsible duties. However, it was also because the local government as an 
institution was facing public distrust with many claims of corruption and politically-
allied favouritism that the CJMM was implementing such measures that ensure not 
only efficiency but effectiveness as well (Van Wyk, 2015). The CJMM has also 
acknowledged the heavy burden SPLUMA (16: 2013) places on local government 
institutions not only on capacity and resources but transparency and good 
governance as well. The CJMM, therefore, increased the number of tribunal 
members and hoped that a municipal-based MPT will allow for a transparent and 
effective process and will aid in aligning the CJMM’s planning principles with the 
needs of the Johannesburg citizens especially with a rotating MPT (Van Wyk, 2015).  
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5.3.1 Transparency and Good governance: Claims of corruption, civic apathy and 
politics 
Like any government institution, the CJMM Planning Committee has to abide by 
certain policies and procedures in their decision making process. In trying to further 
understand the operations of tribunal, it was important to look at the history 
behind the very tribunal that is to be implemented. However, other than attending 
the Planning Committee’s meetings, it was also significant to review the council 
minutes of the Committee and understand reasons behind certain development 
planning application decisions. Due to certain legal and operational circumstances, 
only the 2014/2015 Planning Committee statistics were availed by the City of 
Johannesburg. While it may seem as a limitation to not being able to access the 
Planning Committee records (council minutes) that date further back in years, the 
fact that Mr Van Wyk and Mr Nkosi were able to respond to questions based on 
those records should be seen as a positive. 
 
Therefore, the following statistics (See figure 1.3) were based on the City of 
Johannesburg Planning Committee’s activities of the 2014/2015 financial year. 
These were personally endorsed by the CJMM Legal Administration’s Deputy 
Director Mr Hector Makhubo through the help of the Committee’s Operational 
Manager Ms Rebecca Muthu. In total there were 148 applications that were 
received, with many being lodged over the October/November (36) and 
January/February (24. These applications converted into 187 items for Hearing on 
the Planning Committee. Of the 187 items, only 136 were dealt with, 51 were 
deferred, pended or postponed and 10 were withdrawn. But this picture does not 
reflect much of what the details of the planning committee or planning tribunal are 
or even how they operate or engage with clients. The CJMM’s Planning Committee, 
however, had about 2000 items that were in progress due to a number of reasons. 
The main reason that most of these items are a work in progress was because land 
developments applications were a process themselves and there is much 
paperwork that needed to be approved even after being granted a go ahead to 
develop as well as that some of the applications are in courts. 
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It should be noted that there number of court cases or development applications 
that turned into court appeals were not disclosed for other undisclosed reasons as 
well. Mr Nkosi (2015) was also asked about the various applications that were dealt 
with in courts instead of the Planning Committee. As Mr Nkosi (2015) noted, some 
applications were forwarded to courts because of the conflicts between 
communities and the applicant or also because a municipality staff was somehow 
involved in it as well. He also noted civic apathy on the side of the locals. He 
responded that generally the locals and the residents association feel and complain 
that the council decisions, as the Council takes the final decision after a Planning 
Committee Hearing, are usually unfair and seldom favour politically connected or 
affluent clients. The municipal officials noted that there is a wide speculation that 
the local government is corrupt.  They stated that this is also because the multiple 
court cases that are from the Planning Committee exist because of the objections 
by affected and interested parties and also because of the rivalries between various 
town planning consultants.  
 
Mr Nkosi (2015) also noted that the Planning Committee does also receive a lot of 
complaints pertaining to the operations of the tribunal and claims of bias or unjust 
practices but says that this is all based on assumptions and it is civic apathy. This has 
led to a negative culture among the various residents associations and town 
planning consultants. No evidence could be produced to support this claim as such 
documentation could not be disclosed by the Legal Department within the 
municipality. 
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Figure 1.3: City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Planning Committee 
Statistics for the Year 2014/2015. 
 
As can be seen from the statistics above, certain applications (10) were withdrawn 
and others (51) pending. The statistics also reveal that many of the applications are 
still work in progress. This, according to the stats, could have meant anything. It 
could have meant applications were withdrawn because they did not have all the 
required documentation or that other methods of proceeding with the 
developments were sought. The people interviewed were reluctant, and others 
refused, to respond on why such applications were withdrawn or have been 
pending. Prior to SPLUMA (16: 2013) promulgation, it was understood that the 
norm with many applicants and affected parties was to apply for developments 
without motivating their applications.  
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The reasons for such behaviour was because many applicants had already lost trust 
in the capabilities of the Planning Committee and were aggravated because they 
felt that the Council or the recommending Planning Committee would anyway 
reject their application. Moreover, many other applicants who felt wronged by the 
Council also felt that they would not get decisions their way. The lodged complaints 
by members of the public would get rejected mainly because they lacked any town 
planning merit. The lodged complaints that were revealed by the CJMM included 
follow ups from approved/disapproved development applications that were 
decided through court orders yet the complainants feel that many of those 
approved were financially or politically motivated. 
 
Therefore, as with Brazil’s Balsa Familia social programme, there was a strong 
correlation between the lodged complaints against the CJMM Council or the 
Planning Committee and the multitudes of pending development planning 
applications. This was because some of the applications that are pending are held 
up by court cases with lodged complaints of financial or political motivation or a 
certain clientelistic connection somehow. Another view is that a number of 
applicants who were previously in the employ of the municipality are part of the 
many that are being taken to court due to assumed client-patron relationships with 
current municipal officials. The general tone of the lodged complaints either against 
the Council or the Planning Committee is that external applicants or consultants 
agree on certain terms with internal actors (planners, officials, council) to process 
their applications first.  
 
This, as evident from the interview with Ms Zulu, was because the municipality has 
fired employees before for taking bribes and approving development applications 
without taking them through the Planning Committee. Another eminent issue was 
with the lack of staff capacity and the deployment of junior to take on senior roles. 
The nature of this operation has also led to some believing that applicants seldom 
copy and paste from previous applications because they get information of already 
submitted applications from the municipal officials or town planning counterparts 
(Boyce, 2015). Some of the complaints are also based on the fact there are certain 
relationships within and among consultants and junior planners that are in the 
employ of the municipality. These junior planners have often leaked information to 
fellow planning colleagues at tertiary institutions (3rd Year National Diploma/Final 
Year B.Sc. students) in their personal capacity. 
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This was one of the reasons why many believe that the municipal officials are care 
free about their work and that they often trust their juniors to do the job, thereby 
resulting in undesired outcomes. Moreover, it was also believed that internal 
planners cooperate with external consultants in return for money and other things. 
The clientelistic sequence would be: Client – Internal Planning Recommendation – 
Favourable/Recommended Positive situation – Internal/External Planner follow-up 
– Hearing (Planning Committee) – Favourable date and Committee – Favourable 
decision-making/recommendation – Approval and development go ahead. 
 
It is believed that these kinds of relations or clientelistic relationships drive the 
corruption in local government and thereby renders the Council and its Planning 
Committee non-transparent. It was understood, from Mr Van Wyk and Mr Nkosi’s 
responses, that there are already concerns about the power and authority that the 
SPLUMA (16: 2013) MPT will have because of the lack of experience in daily 
operations of the Planning Committee and speculations of corruption. 
5.3.2 The Planning Committee and its Operations 
 
The main task at hand was to explore the implications of the SPLUMA (16: 2013) 
Municipal Planning Tribunal’ decision-making processes on land development 
applications within the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. In order to 
understand and explore such a significant institution’s decision-making processes, it 
was important to understand how the CJMM Municipal Planning Tribunal is going to 
be implemented.  As part of this process, the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality’s current Planning Committee was observed and assessed. A certain 
number of its panel members were chosen to be interviewed on the specifics of the 
SPLUMA (16: 2013) Municipal Planning Tribunal. The following tasks were at hand: 
 Observing and assessing the Planning Committee, its structure and how it is 
operating. 
 Understand how the CJMM is going to implement its own Municipal 
Planning Tribunal and how that the transition from a Planning Committee to 
a Tribunal will be implemented 
 Understand the CJMM employees’ (panel members) understanding of the 
role of the Municipal Planning Tribunal as well the significance, if any, of the 
location of such an institution. 
 Assess and understand the panel members’ views around corruption, 
clientelism and patrimonialism and the linkages between officials, politicians 
and communities. 
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 Assess the panel’s ideas about ensuring transparency, independence and 
accountability within the Planning Committee or the incumbent Municipal 
Planning Tribunal as well ways in which external influences could be 
minimised. 
 Lastly, it was significant understand how the Appeal Tribunal is going to be 
set up as well as comments on the exclusion of the political leadership by 
the SPLUMA (16: 2013). 
In order to get a holistic sense around the CJMM’s preparations for the SPLUMA 
(16: 2013) MPT, here the reader is presented with the aggregated responses of the 
questions posed to the current members of the CJMM Planning Committee. 
However, the information presented here is not diluted but a rigour analysis of the 
CJMM’s plans regarding the adoption and implementation of a SPLUMA (16: 2013) 
Tribunal. 
The CJMM Planning committee is a 30-member panel that is comprised of five (5) 
legal advisors as chairpersons as well as 20 members from various departments and 
professions as development planning, environment, building, traffic and 
engineering services.  
The planning committee members are: Titus Boyce (Manager: Legal Administration, 
Town Planner); Marie De Beer (Assistant Director: City Transformation, Town 
Planner); Matimba Ratau (Manager: Environment, Environmentalist); Bheki Sithole 
(Town Planner: City Transformation, Town Planner); Emely Zulu (Manager: Legal) 
and Marcy Sekobo (Planning Committee Services, Legal Administrator).  
It is important to also note that the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Municipal Planning Tribunal 
was promulgated along with the Act (16: 2013) on the 1st of July 2015. This is an 
important factor in reading and understanding the data collected and analysed 
here. It is now possible to report on the findings of the data collected from the 
interviews.  
From the interviews or in dealing with the CJMM employees, it was found that they 
are generally aware of such a SPLUMA (16: 2013) Municipal Planning Tribunal yet 
the study reveals that they do not possess in depth knowledge about how such an 
institution is supposed to be set up and by whom. When charged with the question 
about the transition from a Planning Committee to a Municipal Planning Tribunal, 
the results show that the panel members do not see a change in operations or the 
set-up of such a Tribunal as envisaged by SPLUMA (16: 2013). 
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“It is not going to change a lot. We will still have the same members of the Planning 
Committee sitting on the Municipal Planning Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal 
decisions will be taken by the MMC (Development Planning) and the Executive 
Director.“– Titus Boyce (2015) 
The panel members, as the study reflects, were concerned about the experience of 
whoever is going to be on the Tribunal and, as such, believe that the current 
Planning Committee is going to be the CJMM Municipal Planning Tribunal. In 
comparison to the Planning Committee, the study reflects that the panel members 
feel that the Municipal Planning Tribunal has a much greater role to play than the 
current Planning Committee. The panel members felt that as part of the Municipal 
Planning Tribunal they will have to do more tasks and also report to the Appeal 
Tribunal in certain instances. They felt that the Appeal Tribunal will be the senior 
members of the municipality of whom do not have the required technical 
experience or if they have, there are only a few that are available to undertake such 
duties of an Appeal Tribunal. This is better reflected by the statement below: 
“The locational factor can be seen as both positive and negative. This is because we 
have everybody in one place for efficiency and effectiveness sake but that could also 
mean that the members of the Tribunal will almost always be privy to internal 
operations of various departments. Although, on the front of it, the location of the 
Tribunal does not matter, we have capacity problems in this municipality. I can tell 
you that we need to have 6 ADs (Assistant Directors) but there is only me. We do not 
have staff and the guys we have are juniors who lack the prerequisite experience for 
such activities. “ -  Marie De Beer (2015) 
The study showed that the panel members feel better about having a Municipal 
Planning Tribunal and that it is located in local government. “It is a positive one for 
the municipality, as the Tribunal will no longer go against the CJMM’s planning 
procedures anymore.” – Matimba Ratau (2015).  
From the question posed about the impact of the Municipal Planning Tribunal 
geographical location, it can be seen that the panel members did not see any 
general significance or impact but instead some see it as a positive one for the 
municipality. Some of these responses followed logically from the fact that the DFA 
Tribunal, as discussed in the background section of this study, has contradicted the 
CJMM development planning criteria in undertaking certain decisions. Significantly 
so, the study also revealed that the panel members feel the same way about that 
DFA Tribunal as they do about the Townships Board (a statutory planning board 
created in terms of the Town-planning and Townships Ordinance No. 15 of 1986).  
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From working with the panel members, it was found that in previous years the 
Townships Board would take decisions that overlooked the CJMM’s planning 
policies and approve of applications that would normally be disapproved by the 
local government. It was found, from the interviews, that the employees felt having 
their own Tribunal would aid such kind of matters. 
When charged with the question on allegations of corruption in local government 
and the possible impact on the Tribunal, the study shows the panel members as not 
being worried. The study showed that the panel members feel that corruption is 
everywhere and believe that the laws and codes of conduct are in place to deal with 
any corruption issues.  
“With the right checks and balances in terms of how decisions are made and 
institutional arrangements informed by SPLUMA (16: 2013), corruption will not be 
an issue” – Bheki Sithole(2015). 
From the study, we learnt that there have been instances where people have been 
fired for corrupt and non-procedural behaviour. It was also seen that certain 
favours are exchanged but cannot be proven and therefore, there is a general tone 
that corruption is everywhere and not simply in local government alone. Of most 
significance to this data collection for the study was finding out how the SPLUMA 
(16: 2013) Tribunal can be transparent, independent and accountable in the midst 
of clientelism and patrimonialism in local government. The questions posed 
included finding out how the structure of the Appeal Tribunal is to be set out, if 
people can influence the Tribunal and comments on the politicians feeling excluded 
from the Tribunal by SPLUMA (16: 2013). 
The study revealed that most of the panel members did not know or were yet to be 
briefed on who is to sit on the Appeal Tribunal yet they have an understanding of 
the requirements of such a body. While it may not link directly to patrimonialism, 
the study revealed that the panel members were concerned about capabilities of 
such chosen members of the municipality because they would make decisions that 
do not have the proper merits as they do not have an idea of the day-to-day work 
that underlines such development planning decisions. The study further pointed out 
to the fact that the panel members are worried about potential influences and 
corruption if decisions are to be made at a senior level and the work being done at 
the lower level, leading to a Planning Committee and Townships Board kind of 
Situation. 
On transparency, Independence and accountability, it is learnt from the study that 
some of the panel members feel that there are procedures in place to take full 
control of any misconducts while some feel that those very measures have been in 
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place for a while and yet corruption happens. It was also important to note that 
when charged with the questions around politicians feeling excluded from the 
Tribunal, by SPLUMA (16: 2013) the study respondents felt that the politicians could 
be easily influenced to make biased decisions, that politicians cannot take sides as 
they are elected by the community but represent the municipality as well and also 
that the politicians do not have the required town planning knowledge or 
experience to be able to make those key decisions. The City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality has applied to have a CJMM employee-only Tribunal to 
their MMC of Development Planning in this regard. 
“They deter the image of society and, if it was not for them, we would probably still 
have a functional DFA Tribunal, one that does not do its own thing or take bribes 
and approve of things that we disapprove of. I think politicians love too much 
money. We have filed a report with our MMC to have that sorted out. We would like 
to be our own Tribunal, only comprised of persons in the employ of the municipality 
and nobody else.  
This is because external persons can be influenced and can also advance their own 
interests.” -  Marie De Beer (2015) 
However, while the panel responded to the questions posed to them, it should be 
noted that some of them were reluctant to respond to the questions on corruption, 
clientelism and patrimonialism after being explained what clientelism and 
patrimonialism are. It can be attained from the study that there have been 
numerous cases of employees being fired from work for taking bribes and some of 
them were linked to politicians. This, however, was blamed more to the hierarchy 
within the municipality and how many of the low level workers aspire to reach 
senior positions and therefore will stop at nothing to get promoted. It was also 
learnt from the study that the panel members felt there was pressure to be corrupt 
at the local level because of the local interests. The study revealed that the panel 
members were all concerned if the municipality can handle the duties of the 
Tribunal because they felt they were already stretched with their current Planning 
Committee duties adding onto their day-to-day activities.  
5.4 Conclusions 
SPLUMA (16: 2013) is a fairly new legislature, and it was only promulgated on the 1st 
of July 2015. On the implementation of such an institution, the study revealed that 
the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality would slowly implement it and, 
as such, the municipality has some issues to overcome in the process.  
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The National Treasury Report (2013) and the Ratings Afrika Municipal Financial 
Stability Index (2012) cited the contradiction of the Municipal Finance Management 
Act (56: 2003), the lack of skills and lack of management experience as factors that 
affect and threaten the financial strength of local government. Therefore, the 
general governance and operation would be affected as well. While analysis of the 
latest Treasury Report (2013) may show that the CJMM as a well capacitated 
municipality, the study revealed that the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality has a capacity problem.  
This meant that implementing institutions such as the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Municipal 
Planning Tribunal overburdens the already thinly capacitated municipality.  
On assessing the CJMM Planning Committee, the study showed that the 
respondents felt that they were already short staffed and that the experience 
required by the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Municipal Planning Tribunal and its Appeal 
Tribunal might eventually be an issue as they currently lack senior members of staff 
in their own departments and that they lagging behind with departmental work 
when attending the Committee meetings. This was seen as a huge factor toward 
determining or achieving efficiency, effectiveness and good governance in local 
government. 
In comparison to the Balsa La Familia program, the interviews with the CJMM 
Planning Committee have revealed the thin line between clientelism, 
patrimonialism and corruption. This was because they do not offer social programs 
or projects to communities in return for votes but as in the Balsa La Familia. From 
the interviews, the members of the Planning Committee attested to having had 
cases of corrupt behaviour yet those were the only few to have been investigated 
and actually dealt with. Many other cases remain a rumour and speculation without 
tangible evidence. A significant point noted is that the CJMM’ administrative 
employees do not get direct orders from their political leadership instead they get a 
to-do list of items through the municipal manager’s ‘score card’.  
In Brazil politicians were at the forefront of implementing local community 
programs, in the CJMM the task is given to Municipal Owned Entities (MOEs) with 
the aid of all the municipal departments. What the politicians have then is a claim of 
having fought for such developments or improvements than being seen doing so. 
This has, some way or another, been seen as a way to cut ties between patrons and 
their clients. However, the study also revealed to a certain extent that the City 
Manager’s score card could be a politically influenced decision that is enforced and 
that the lower level employees are bound to do the items on such a list as urgent as 
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possible. This could mean more politically influenced decisions could occur in 
development applications as well. 
In essence, the implications of implementing a SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal and 
Appeal Tribunal for the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality were 
mainly on the capacity of the required officials to sit on those Tribunals as well as 
the measures to promote independent and transparent decision-making that is 
accountable and ensures good governance within the municipality. The task implied 
here was not to have the same issues as had with the DFA-led Tribunal or the 
Townships Board but to have enough capacity to implement such a SPLUMA (16: 
2013) Tribunal without negatively affecting the operations and governing of the 
local municipality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
6 CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the research report’s discussion, recommendation and 
conclusions. The chapter indicates where and how the research objectives have 
been met. The results of the findings are discussed here hence the research 
question is answered. All the methodological and theoretical issues or problems 
associated with the research will also be indicated here. 
6.2 Research Purpose 
The research report purpose explores the implications of the SPLUMA Municipal 
Planning Tribunal. The focus was on the workings and/or operations of a tribunal in 
local government. The study, therefore, utilised the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality’s Planning Committee to gauge that. The study sought to 
explore how the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Municipal Planning Tribunal will be set up and 
implemented. In exploring these, the focus of the study was on locational factors (in 
terms of the actual locational relationship between the Tribunal institution and the 
municipality); it was on implementation of the tribunal institution; it was on the 
aspect of power (and interest) and the politicisation of issues as well as; issues on 
the relationship between the Tribunal and the municipal council (autonomy, 
independence, and politicisation of issues). 
6.3 Methods and Procedures 
The research was first and foremost qualitative because of the exploratory nature 
of it. The exploratory nature of the research was because at the writing of this 
report SPLUMA (16: 2013) had been enacted but was yet to be implemented to 
operate. Through the qualitative methodology, here the reader is able to explore 
the innate experiences of the people interviewed. However, the context of the 
research is also significant. The study also utilised the case study method. This has 
allowed the research to be in context and has allowed for use of varied data 
sources. The case study is of the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality in 
the City of Johannesburg. Within the case study method, the study finds a historical 
approach in order to explore the history and organisational culture of the local 
government in question. Through the historical approach the author was able to 
examine and communicate past events as they relate to the Tribunal in question. 
Content analysis was also used to observe and learn about discourse through the 
material perused. Through content analysis, various documents allowed for a 
holistic analytical approach to the research.   
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As a critical method of research, interviews provided the solid research data that 
speaks to the documents analysed as well as that recaptures the lived experience of 
the Tribunal, Township board and Planning Committee members of the City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. Therefore, the interviews provided the 
much needed perspectives and opinions that underpin the above mentioned 
observatory techniques. The selection method or technique used in the study was 
snowballing. This is because the people interviewed were not all known from the 
beginning and thus the research worked through a referral system.  
6.3.1 Data analysis 
Constant comparative analysis was used to analyse the information retrieved. In 
order to make sense of data, comparative analysis uses previous accounts of a 
certain Tribunal that existed (the DFA-led Tribunal in this instance was used) to see 
similar or varied trajectories and benchmarking. Through this method, the author 
was able to use the DFA-led Tribunal, the Townships Board and the Balsa La Familia 
program to capture and understand the implications of adopting and implementing 
a Tribunal at local government level. Lastly, phenomenological approaches are that 
individual case experiences bring about the different understanding and meaning of 
a tribunal from all the various perspectives presented. 
6.4 Major Findings 
The research’s main focus was on the adoption, implementation and operation of a 
SPLUMA (16: 2013) MPT/Tribunal at the local level of government, the City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. The following is an account of the main 
findings in this discourse report. 
6.4.1 Background 
The CJMM is a local government structure in terms of the Municipal Systems Act 
(32: 2000) and is authorised by the Ordinance (15: 1986) to determine land 
rezoning and township establishment applications within its municipal boundaries. 
However, the DFA (67: 1995) Tribunal, from 1997 onward, decided on such 
applications as the CJMM within the CJMM boundaries. In doing so, it contradicted 
the CJMM planning instruments and, after being taken to the Constitutional Court 
to clarify legislative authorities, the DFA-led Tribunal was disbanded. This has led to 
the introduction of a new SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal at the local level of 
government. This Tribunal was entrusted with the same tasks as the provincial-
based DFA Tribunal. The issues regarding this change have led to the need to 
explore the implications of a SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal. 
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6.4.2 Findings 
As a precursor to the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal, the CJMM had a Planning 
Committee. This was the committee that hears matters regarding development and 
makes recommendations to the municipal council for final decision making. The 
Planning Committee has long existed and many a municipality has always been 
dealing with its development planning applications through such a committee. The 
CJMM had also started implementing its own tribunal. 
First and foremost, the CJMM was, at the time, transitioning between a Planning 
Committee and a Tribunal. The current tribunal is made up of the same structure as 
the CJMM’s Planning Committee. The tribunal is made of 5 members, 3 of which 
can form a quorum, who are chosen from a pool of 30 officials in the employ of the 
municipality. According to SPLUMA (16: 2013) s6, a MPT should also include non-
officials who have experience and knowledge. However, the CJMM has an all-official 
member in its tribunal. From the findings, it was understood the CJMM is yet to 
have any external people with experience that have shown interest to be part of the 
tribunal.  
One member of the current Planning Committee also stated that they would not be 
able to appoint ex-officials as it would be seen as unjust because they were once 
employees of the CJMM. Furthermore, he stated that many of the ex-officials now 
have practices and therefore there is a conflict of interest with appointing such 
personnel. Another reason for not appointing non-officials to the tribunal was for 
financial reasons. The CJMM found it more effective and efficient to utilise its 
employees than pay someone new. Despite all this, the CJMM has followed 
protocol in implementing its tribunal. This is because they have a 5-member panel 
with all the prerequisite experience and knowledge. 
One of the major factors in implementing the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal for the 
CJMM was capacity. This was noted from the interviews, with almost all of the 
Planning Committee members stressing that there is great need for capacity. There 
were plans to increase the 30-man official list to 50 in order to reduce the impact 
such a tribunal has on the employees’ daily activities. Being part of the tribunal 
takes one away from their duties and as such, the panel members felt that they are 
lagging behind with the work. This was seen as a problem. Moreover, the CJMM 
had reported to a lack of senior and more experienced personnel to head 
departments and ultimately sit on the tribunal because the majority of their stuff is 
made of junior staff. It was also found that the workload that the tribunal brings 
with may cause capacity and time lag response issues. 
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In the quest to be more transparent and for good governance, the CJMM intended 
to continue operating on a rotating tribunal. That is, not have the same people 
presiding over the tribunal at all times but rather different. From the findings, it was 
also understood that the burden on capacity, resources, governance and 
transparency that SPLUMA (16: 2013) places on local government will be mitigated 
through not only rotating members of the tribunal but working together with the 
senior-most employees of the CJMM as well as following procedures. 
On transparency and claims of corruption, it was understood that there are 
measures in place to deal with any non-procedural behaviour. However, it was also 
understood from the interviews that the CJMM employees acknowledge instances 
of corrupt that has been dealt with where culprits have been penalised, suspended 
and even fired at times. The findings also revealed that issues and concerns of 
corruption do exists and that the CJMM is continually faced with claims that they 
cannot be proven and deals made with no tangible evidence to link the 
perpetrators. There was a clear stance among those interviewed that corruption is 
only corruption if it can be proven and that the wide speculations that are out 
about local government cannot proven to be true. Furthermore, they stated that 
there are procedures in place and code of conducts for everybody in the work place 
coupled with harsh penalties. 
It was found that there are court cases (which could not be disclosed) that are 
pending and some of which had just been initiated that involve officials in the 
employ of the municipality as well as private planning consultants. These cases, it 
was found, are part of them many pending development applications that are 
believed to have some fraudulent matters involved or have been approved without 
going through the tribunal. This was a concern that many of the interviewed 
members of the Planning Committee have vocalised when it comes to having the 
CJMM Tribunal being comprised of external people. 
On the wide spread allegations of local government corruption, it was found out 
that there is civic apathy and that cannot be directed as a legal court case. The 
findings also skewed toward a general distrust between resident associations and 
the municipality because of the history between the two. The CJMM was believed 
to have been acting in favour of developers and approving of developments that do 
not benefit the residents. Therefore, beyond the court cases that are pending, there 
was multiple development planning applications that were also pending and have 
been halted due to objections from the affected parties, including the residents 
association. 
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The CJMM Planning Committee also reported on the exclusion of political 
representatives on the tribunal. It was found that the chairman of the tribunal has 
filed a report asking to set up a tribunal that has no politicians in it. This was 
because, as found from the interviews, politicians are believed to lack to lack the 
prerequisite experience and knowledge about development planning. It was also 
found that politicians will try to influence decisions in their own without considering 
the merits of each application. It was also reported that politicians will be most 
susceptible to corruption because of the voting constituency that comes with public 
interaction. 
On the general implementation of the tribunal, the panel members of the Planning 
Committee felt that it brought no change to the current set up of how the 
committee is set up or operates. They also stated that much will remain the same as 
the committee until such a point they are able to fully implement all the 
requirements by SPLUMA (16: 2013). The findings also showed a positive response 
about having a municipal-located tribunal because of the effectiveness and 
efficiency but as well as no conflict of interest or decisions. This was also based on 
the experience of some of the panel members who were either in the Townships 
Board or the DFA-led Tribunal.  
In summation, the findings showed a positive response from the interviewed panel 
members of the Planning Committee when it concerns the tribunal. However, a few 
issues remained intact. The findings revealed a concern about capacity, knowledge 
and experience within the work force of the municipality and thus for the tribunal 
as well. As a measure to prevent political interference, the findings revealed that 
the CJMM committee has preferred to not have any politicians sit on the tribunal. 
On independence, transparency and good governance, the findings revealed that 
there were measures in place in the form of code of conducts and other working 
legislatures as well as that the tribunal will be a rotating one with multiple 
personnel utilised to sit on the tribunal. Beyond that, applicants for development 
are only notified on the day of the tribunal/Planning Committee hearing about the 
members who sit on it. 
While being short staffed is an issue, the findings also revealed then need to 
increase the number of people selected to sit on the Tribunal in order to mitigate 
the effects on daily work or activities of all the employees and for greater efficiency 
of the municipality. It remains a grey matter when it comes to corruption claims, 
pending development applications or court cases that are linked to either municipal 
employees or politicians. 
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6.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This section provides assessment of the results and their meaning by evaluation and 
interpretation. The section refers to the objectives and questions as outlined in 
Chapter 1 and respond to them using the results obtained in the study. While the 
findings may have been detailed already and interpretation given, it is also 
important to understand, point to point, how such questions have been responded 
to and how, if so. Therefore, the section cited several studies, including the case 
studies, to compare and contrast with the findings. 
How will municipalities (the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality) 
implement the adoption of the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal? 
As found from the results, the City of Johannesburg intends to use the current set 
up of their own Development Planning Committee as a transitional tribunal. This 
will consist of a 30-member officials-list. A number of 5 members will be selected 
from this list to attend to and hear a tribunal. The CJMM intends to utilise the same 
staff as used on the committee.  
In what way will the locational factors (i.e. the geographical relationship between 
the municipality and the tribunal) affect or not affect the tribunal? 
From the findings, it has been noted that the location of the tribunal will not 
adversely affect its decision on development applications or be impacted anyhow. 
As seen from the literature, the DFA-led tribunal made decisions that were not in 
accordance with the local government. However, the location of the tribunal, in 
terms of SPLUMA (16: 2013), was seen here as not a factor or threat of any kind. In 
fact, the findings revealed a positive response toward having a locally based 
tribunal. This was because it was believed that the tribunal would not contradict the 
planning criteria and would adhere to the development plans of the CJMM. 
In what way will the effect or possibility of clientelism in government and the 
tribunal be alleviated? 
 
From the findings, it was understood that the CJMM intends to operate on a 
rotating tribunal and that no applicant will get knowledge of the tribunal that will 
hear their application until the day of their tribunal hearing. Secondly, it was also 
understood that there are legislations and procedures in place. This was evident 
from cited court cases that are pending due to fraudulent and corrupt activities, as 
found from the results.  
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In what way will municipalities monitor and evaluate the Tribunal? 
While the results (findings) did not clearly state how will the tribunal be monitored 
and evaluated, it was important to note that the findings revealed that a tribunal is 
a state mechanism that is controlled and legislated by the government laws and 
institutional procedures. The findings also revealed that there are measures in place 
to ensure that only qualified and experienced people sit on the tribunal. It was also 
clear from the findings that the link between patrimonialism and clientelism is a 
thin line that cannot be interrogated if it is based on wide spread allegations.  
In what way will the tribunal be guaranteed autonomy and independence from the 
municipal council or any other outside influence? 
 
There was no clear response retrieved from the findings about guaranteeing 
autonomy and independence of the tribunal. The findings revealed that the tribunal 
will be operating with a better understanding of the municipality’s development 
planning criteria and thus its decisions will not conflict or contradict that of the 
internal planning departments. This suggests that the municipal planning tribunal 
will be more in tandem with internal planning instruments or departments. With 
regard to the influence from the outside or municipal, the findings showed that the 
current panel members of the planning committee prefer to not have any outside 
influence. However, the findings also revealed a great concern by the panel 
members with the knowledge that the council is to be the appeal tribunal. 
Therefore, this suggests that the tribunal is not an autonomous and independent 
body because it is subjected to internal town planning criteria and operations as 
well as the municipal council’s decisions. 
How will the issue of politicisation be dealt with? (Potential politics to impede or 
intervene) 
It was very clear from the findings that politicians will not form part of the municipal 
planning tribunal or the appeal tribunal. Beyond that, the current chairperson of the 
CJMM Planning Committee has also filed a report requesting to not have any 
politicians (councillors or any other) sit on the tribunal. However, the politicisation 
of issues remains an issue. The findings showed that there is a lot of pressure being 
placed on the municipal administrative staff by the Municipal Manager or the 
Executive Directors. This was believed, as shown from the findings, to be a sort of 
‘score card’ by the political leadership to the City Managers. This, in one way or 
another, should be seen as some sort of political influence. 
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In contrast to the Balsa La Familiar cited in Chapter 2, the political influence and 
intervention within the municipality was fostered through administrative tasks and 
other daily activities. Secondly, the politicians on the ground have no access or 
influence to the actual approval and implementation of development applications. 
However, the senior political leadership has a say somehow on the operations of 
the municipality and thus on the municipal tribunal or the planning committee. The 
research report has largely relied on information on and from the old DFA-led 
Tribunal, the experience of some previous members of the Townships Board as well 
as on the current Planning Committee. The Brazilian case study was used here to 
reflect on the potential politics to impede on matters and operations of a tribunal 
and the case study has proven otherwise due to the lack of direct involvement by 
the politicians that are linked with the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality. 
The literature on governance stated that no single entity controls the government 
but that the bureaucracy is controlled by the president, the cabinet, the law and the 
communities as well. In the context of local government, the CJMM in specific, the 
municipality was in the hands of both the administrative and political leadership. 
The latter is elected, is in the driving seat and has control over the operations of the 
municipality. The former comprises of appointed officials who operate the 
municipality. 
These officials act on behalf of the public and the municipality’s interest, bearing in 
mind that there are political mandates in hindsight that influence ways in which the 
municipality goes about its business. It was evident from the research that the 
tribunal is an important institution in terms of driving development within the 
municipality and, as such, it was susceptible to influences from the private sector, 
the communities and the municipality, be it in the form of work politics or 
otherwise. Therefore, one of the generalisations to be made here was that the 
tribunal will definitely be influenced by the political senior heads within the 
municipality through the appeal tribunal and this could prove detrimental for the 
municipality’s ratings on good governance and transparency.  
Secondly, it was very clear that the administrative leadership of the municipality is 
doing all it can to exclude the political representatives yet they cannot get rid of the 
mayors and all other patrimonial linkages between the senior administrative staff 
and the political appointees due to the structure of government in South Africa. 
Lastly, and most significant, the tribunal will be implemented in stages and such 
incremental arrangements include utilising the current CJMM Planning Committee 
as the tribunal and slowly implementing all the other requirements as envisioned by 
SPLUMA (16: 2013).  
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This has required the CJMM to increase capacity, rotate the members of the 
Planning Committee and seek for more experienced and qualified personnel to 
implement such a tribunal. 
The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (16: 2013) was a new 
development planning legislature at the time of writing this research and would be 
implemented in all of the local governments nationwide. As such, some 
municipalities would be more capable than others to implement it without suffering 
operational or functional setbacks. 
6.6 Recommendations 
Since SPLUMA (16: 2013) is newly in operation, there is a need to grasp and 
understand the SPLUMA (16: 2013) Tribunal when it is in operation and the changes 
it brings to local government going forth. There is a need to go back and forth, 
compare and contrast the Tribunals, the planning committees, the Township Board, 
the DFA tribunals and all the other previous (before 1995) tribunals when the 
Tribunal has been in place for at least a certain period of time. There is a need to 
understand the effects and/or impacts of the implementation of the Tribunal once 
it has been placed into operation. There’s a great discovery that lies beneath 
understanding the differences in municipalities, be it urban and rural or metro and 
local, and how they have taken the implementation of the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal can be implemented in multiple forms, be it a single or joint Tribunal 
or use a district municipality as a Tribunal. Therefore, there is also a need to 
understand how in such instances a Tribunal will be implemented. It is also 
necessary to explore the politicisation of issues and the external influences by 
grasping an understanding of this Tribunal implementation from a private 
consultant or a politician’s perspective. This research explored and has potential to 
explore more than the implementation of Municipal Planning Tribunal. Capacity and 
resources have always been cited as issues in the South African local government. 
Having to increase local government institutions, such as the introduction of a 
tribunal, brings with it core issues of resource and capacity. Such institutions require 
a set level of expertise, knowledge and experience and these are qualities many a 
municipality do not possess. Therefore, the mere implementation of a tribunal in 
under capacitated situations could prove a research friendly quest. 
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8 ADDENDUM 
 
8.1 Interview Questionnaire 
 
Research Question 
What are the implications of the SPLUMA’ Municipal Planning Tribunal’s decision-
making processes on development planning applications? 
 
Sub question 1: How will the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
(CJMM) implement the adopting of the SPLUMA (16: 2013) MPT? 
 
In order to understand and be able to explore the implications of a SPLUMA MPT 
and its decision-making processes it is important to know and understand how the 
Tribunal will be implemented as an institution. 
 
Interview questions: 
 
 The transition from a Planning Committee to a Municipal Planning Tribunal 
is an important one, how will the CJMM adopt the SPLUMA (16: 2013) MPT? 
 What do you think about the role of the MPT? How would you look at the 
MPT in comparison to the existing Planning Committee? 
 How do you feel about having an MPT at a local government level? 
 
 
Sub question 2: In what way will the locational factors (the geographical 
relationship between the municipality and the Tribunal) affect or not affect the 
Tribunal? 
 
Interview questions: 
 
 Beyond having a MPT at local government, what do you think about such an 
institution’s locational factors, that it is located within the premises of a 
local government? 
 There are wide spread allegations of corruption in local government, what is 
your view of having such an important institution (Tribunal) being located 
within local government? 
 
Sub question 3: How will the effect or possibility of clientelism in government and 
the Tribunal be alleviated? 
96 
 
   
Interview questions:  
 According to Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2002) the term clientelism, “a 
complex chain of bonds between political patrons or bosses and their 
individual clients or followers” (p2.), it follows a problem-solving notion or 
logic because it is usually for those with limited access to resources and it 
flourishes as a power relationship in environments which are politically or 
economically insecure.  
 
In light of the above, what do you think about clientelistic relations between 
the political and administrative leadership and their subservient 
communities through institutions like the Tribunal? 
Sub question 4: There is a link between patrimonialism and clientelism, in what 
way will the municipality monitor and evaluate the Tribunal? 
 
Interview questions:  
 Patrimony has been the subject and focus of political relations and 
affiliations in and between people. As such, key institutions in local 
government such as the Tribunal and its Appeal Tribunal preside over such 
developments that impact on the communities and its operations are almost 
tied political terms.  
 
How can the Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal be responsible, transparent 
and accountable and not be subject to patron-client relationships that have 
existed over long periods of time in the name of patrimony?  
 
Given than at local level there are local interests, Do you think this may have 
greater pressure for corruption? 
 
Sub question 5: How will the Tribunal be guaranteed autonomy and independence 
from the municipal council or any other external influence? 
 
Interview questions: 
 Who is going to sit on the Appeal Tribunal?  
 How are you going to ensure transparency, independence and autonomy of 
the MPT? Steps and procedures to be taken. 
 In your view, are people able to influence institutions such as Tribunals in 
advancing their own interests or developments?  
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 In your view, how would you have implemented such a Tribunal? Where 
would it be located? Who would it constitute? Why? NB: Dependent on 
response. 
 
Sub question 6: How will the issue of politicisation be dealt with? 
 
In democratic society, all parties are involved in the decision-making. There are 
certain factions of the society that feel that the SPLUMA tribunal is exclusive to the 
political representatives. 
 
Interview questions: 
 It is a known ideal that political positions in government have their own 
political terms of office and are tied to voting constituencies. What do you 
think about the influence of politicians or potential politics to impede and 
intervene in matters of the Tribunal? 
 Secondly, the politicians feel that they are excluded by the SPLUMA 
(16:2013) legislature to not form part of the Tribunals. This, the political 
leadership says, is unjust because they are the elected representatives of 
their communities and, as such, should be a part of the Tribunal. 
What is your view on this statement? 
 
 
